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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers Florida judicial decisions and legislation that
appeared between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000. As in past years, the
volume is huge. So many cases and statutes can have an impact on real
estate that we had to limit our coverage to what we thought would be of
particular interest to the real estate community.' Our goal is to inform our
readers of what has happened and, on occasion when we thought it was
needed, to voice agreement, disagreement, or suggestions for the future. As
always, we urge you to read the original cases and acts. As readers will
discover, real estate law continues to develop in interesting ways.
Il. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. In General
2Munao v. Homeowners Ass'n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park.
Owners of mobile homes who rented spaces in a mobile home park
challenged the rent as unreasonable because the landlord had reduced the
3amenities. The trial court ruled in their favor and ordered a rent reduction,
retroactively and prospectively until repairs were made.4 The court also
ordered the payment of attorneys' fees. The fees were challenged on the
ground that the plaintiff tenants had not proved all the defects they had
alleged in their complaint.6 The district court pointed out that "the test is
whether the party 'succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which
I. Some areas, such as land use planning, are excluded because they are to be
covered by separate survey articles. Other areas, like regulation of the construction industry,
are too specialized to be of interest to our readers.
2. 740 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
3. Id. at 75. The landlord and tenant issues of this case are discussed in the Landlord
and Tenant section of this article. See discussion infra Part XIII.
4. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 75.
5. Id.
6. Id. at78.
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achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."' 7 The
plaintiff had won a rent reduction and the restoration of amenities, which
was enough to make it a prevailing party.s
The landlord also challenged the use of a multiplier in the calculation of
attorneys' fees because the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee agreement was only
partly based on a contingency fee.9 The district court found the use of the
multiplier to be proper because the trial court had carefully explained the
factors used to conclude that a contingency risk multiplier was warranted
and justified the use of those factors based upon the expert witness
testimony, Rule 4-1.5 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, section
57.104 of the Florida Statutes, and relevant Florida case law.1°
Tri-County Development Group, Inc. v. C.P.T. of South Florida, Inc."
The tenant was a corporation owned by Barrett Hess.12 The landlord sued
the tenant for a breach of the lease.1 3 Included as defendants were Mr. Hess,
C.P.T., and Profitable Investment Corporation, another company that Hess
owned.1 4 The defendants' answer denied the landlord's claims and also
stated, "[tihe claims against DEFENDANTS, HESS AND CPT, are wholly
without factual and/or legal merit and the DEFENDANTS should be
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to F.S. 57.105. "15 The trial court awarded
$75,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to tenant Profitable Investment
Corporation based upon the attorneys' fees provision in the lease. 16 The
landlords appealed claiming that the tenant had failed to properly plead its
claim for attorneys' fees and, therefore, waived its attorneys' fees claim.
17
The unsuccessful appeal was based on two theories.
18
First, the answer did not specify whether attorneys' fees were sought
based upon the contract or upon a statute.19 To the extent that section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes was mentioned, the answer did not specify under
7. Id. (quoting Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 809-10 (Fla. 1992)).
8. Id. at 79.
9. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 78-79.
10. Id. at 79-80.
11. 740 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
12. Id. at 573.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 573-74.
15. Id. at 574.
16. Tr-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 574.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
2000]
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which subsection attorney's' fees were being sought.2 The district court
found this unpersuasive. Waiver benefited the tenant rather than the
22landlord . The court stated:
[W]here a party has notice that an opponent claims entitlement to
attorney's fees, and by its conduct recognizes or acquiesces to that
claim or otherwise fails to object to the failure to plead the
entitlement, that party waives any objection to the failure to plead a
claim for attorney's fees.23
Any challenges to or questions about that claim could have and should have
been raised by a responsive pleading.2 Failure to do so resulted in waiver of
the objections.2 5 Moreover, section 57.105(1) of the Florida Statutes
provided for attorneys' fees based on bringing a frivolous claim or action,
and subsection two of the same statute provided for attorneys' fees under a
contract where the contract would have allowed the other party to recover
attorneys' fees for prevailing.26 Thus, claiming attorneys' fees under section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes effectively gives notice that a claim is being
made for either or both statutory or contractual attorneys' fees.27
The next theory was that the answer only mentioned the claims against
Hess and C.P.T. as being without merit and, therefore, Profitable Investment
Corporation had not made any claim for attorneys' fees.2 However, the
answer said that "the DEFENDANTS should be awarded attorney's fees."
29
The tenant was one of the defendants.30 In fact, the tenant was the only
defendant who was a party to the lease that was the subject of the suit and
which contained the attorneys' fees provision to which subsection two of the
statute would apply.31 Thus, the claim was sufficient to give the landlord
notice that all three defendants were seeking attorneys' fees.
32
20. Id.
21. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
22. Id. at 574.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 575.
25. Id.
26. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 574.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
32. Id.
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B. Eminent Domain
Reese v. Department of Transportation.33  The Department of
Transportation ("DOT") began proceedings to take the entire property.
3 4
Reese challenged the taking, but the DOT prevailed after an evidentiary
hearing. 35 The tenant appealed. 36 The parties reached an agreement that the
appeal would be dismissed in exchange for the DOT allowing the tenants to
remain two additional months.37 During that period, the tenant realized a
profit of $58,098." The tenant then claimed attorneys' fees equal to thirty-
three percent of that profit.39 The trial court rejected the attorneys' fees
claim and the district court affirmed.4°
Under section 73.092(1) of the Florida Statutes, attorneys' fees in an
eminent domain proceeding are to be based on the benefit the attorney
achieved for the client.4 That benefit could be monetary or nonmonetary,
but in this case the court could find neither, characterizing the profit
achieved during the extended period of possession as betterment that the
tenant had achieved for itself by its own efforts.42
The district court also rejected the argument that the statute produced
an unconstitutional result in this case.43 The argument was raised for the
first time on appeal."4 Failure to raise the issue in the trial court would
constitute waiver unless the trial court had made a fundamental error.45 In
the lease, the tenant assigned any condemnation settlement or award, except
business damages.4 However, the Florida Constitution does not require the
payment of business damages or attorneys' fees incurred in recovering
thern 7  Business damages are a benefit provided by the legislature and
33. 743 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 1228.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1228.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1229; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2000).
42. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1229.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1228.
47. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1228.
2000]
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failure of the court to award them without being asked would not be
fundamental error.4
Department of Transportation v. Lakepointe Associates.49 As noted,
section 73.092(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that attorneys' fees should
be calculated based "solely on the benefits achieved for the client."50 It goes
on to provide that "benefits means the difference... between the final
judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority.",51 In this case, the landowner had received a letter purporting to
be a "summary of the Department's offer" for the property.52 The letter had
a line for the signature of the District Right of Way Administrator, but that
person had not signed it because such letters were routinely sent out without
signatures.5 3 The landowner's attorneys claimed that this was not a valid
offer and that the attorneys' fees should therefore be based on the final
judgment, i.e., calculate the benefit as if the offer had been zero."4 The trial
court agreed that there had not been a valid offer.55 The statute did not
specify what to do in such a case, so the trial court decided to calculate fees
based on the difference between the final judgment and the figure testified to
by the DOT's expert.
56
The district court disagreed, concluding there had been a valid offer.57
Focusing on the purpose of the statute and reading it in pari materia with
section 119.07(3)(n) of the Florida Statutes, the court concluded that the
letter was an offer within the meaning of this attorneys' fees statute.58 The
statute did not require an offer that could, by mere acceptance, ripen into a
contract.59 In fact, what was anticipated was that a formal contract would be
executed if the landowner agreed to the terms of the offer. 6° "Moreover, it is
48. Id. at 1229.
49. 745 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
50. FRA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2000).
51. § 73.092(1)(a).
52. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 365.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 366.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 367.
57. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 367.
58. Id. at 368. Section 119.07 of the Florida Statutes provides that a contract to
purchase property acquired by eminent domain shall not be formalized for 30 days by the
condemning agency in order to give the public time to review the transaction. FLA. STAT
§ 119.07(3)(n) (2000).
59. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 367-68.
60. Id. at 368.
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clear from the circumstances that the letter was intended as a binding offer,
despite the absence of a signature. ' 61 Thus, the court managed to avoid
dealing with the difficult problem of how to calculate attorneys' fees if the
condemnor makes no offer.62
C. Homeowner Associations
Southpointe Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Segarra.63 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly concluded and did not abuse its discretion
when it awarded $785 for attorneys' fees and $133 for costs, due to the fact
that the homeowner had attempted to settle the matter and that the
association had been quick to file suit.
64
The dispute arose over a $294 arrearage for maintenance and dues that
the homeowner owed the association.65 The homeowner testified that she
had made efforts to determine the exact amount she owed so that she could
pay it but had difficulty in obtaining this information from the association's
law firm.66 The association sought $4646 in attorneys' fees and $689 in
costs.67 The trial court observed that the association had been quick to file
suit and that the amount of fees claimed over $294 was outrageous.68 The
law firm sought fees for 29.4 hours.69 The court awarded three hours for the
lawyer's time and two hours for paralegal time.
70
The court held that the trial court properly concluded the case and that
it did not abuse its discretion when it found the homeowner was sincere in
her efforts to settle and the association was too quick to file suit.71 It based
this on the fact that the trial court is able, based on its familiarity with the
type of litigation involved, to determine that some work was unnecessary.
72
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. 763 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
64. Id. at 1186.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Segarra, 763 So. 2d at 1186.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1187.
72. Id; see Wiederhold v. Wiederhold, 696 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 4th Dis. Ct. App. 1997).
20001
Nova Law Review
Ill. CONDOMINIUMS
Gulf Island Resort, LP. v. Gulf Island Beach & Tennis Club
Condominium Ass'n I, Inc." The issue was whether the trial court properly
held that the association could file a complaint seeking alternate remedies of
lien foreclosure or money judgment, and could elect different remedies on
different delinquent units in the same action.74
The association brought suit against Gulf for delinquency in mainten-• 75
ance assessments on forty-one units that Gulf owned. The association
sought alternate remedies of lien foreclosure or a money judgment on
different units based on the amount of equity in the units.76 The trial court
entered two partial final judgments of foreclosure on twenty-two units and a
monetary judgment of $53,593.49 against Gulf which was the delinquent
amount owed on the other units.77 Gulf appealed this judgment, arguing that
the final decision must either be foreclosure on all units or a monetary
judgment.78
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct and that the
association was entitled to seek alternate remedies and elect the judgment of
foreclosure on some units and a monetary judgment for remaining
assessments in the same action. 79 The court based its opinion on section
718.116(6)(a) of the Condominium Act.?'
Wellington Property Management v. Parc Corniche Condominium
Ass'n.81 The issue here was whether a bare majority of condominium
owners could amend the declaration pursuant to a provision in the
declaration by "add[ing] a new provision which permits the common
elements to be amended or altered and, by applying this new provision
retroactively, defeat the vested rights of the pre-amendment purchasers.
82
In this case, the condominium association made an amendment to the
declaration that would allow the association to alter the common elements by
73. 740 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
74. Id. at 64.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Gulflsland Resort, LP., 740 So. 2d at 65.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (1997)); see Mellor v. Goldberg, 658 So.
2d 1162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1995); Gottschamer v. August, Thompson, Sherr, Clark &
Shafer, P.C., 438 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1983).
81. 755 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
82. Id. at 825.
[Vol. 25:115
Brown / Grohman
a fifty-one percent vote of the board of directors.8 3 The court held that due
to the importance placed on the common elements, when interpreting a
general power to amend in the declaration, the court must "consider the
statutory law and other provisions of the declaration and by-laws applicable
when the condominium was purchased in order to determine existing
rights." The court found that a purchaser should be able to rely on the
provisions of the declaration at the time of purchase, so the purchaser may
determine its ability to afford the unit.85 In its interpretation of section
718.110(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides for the alteration of the
declaration as provided by the declaration, the court found the legislature
was talking about a provision existing in the declaration at the time of
purchase.8 The court reversed and remanded this case.8
7
Legislation affecting condominiums includes the addition of a new
section for multicondominium associations and statutory authority for
transferring limited common elements.88 Also, there is a definition of a
"successor or assignee" of a first mortgagee who takes title to a
condominium by foreclosure and receives limited liability for outstanding
association assessments.89 For that protection one must be a successorholder of the first mortgage.90
IV. CONSTRUCTION
Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc. v. Autopump Services Co.91  Sunshine
operated convenience stores with self-service gasoline stations. 9- It had
contracted for the removal of its old filling station equipment and the
installation of new tanks, pumps, and a protective canopy at one of its
stores.93 After a subcontractor put in the tanks and pumps, the contractor
83. Id.
84. Id. at 826.
85. Id.
86. Wellington Prop. Mgmt., 755 So. 2d at 826-27.
87. Id. at 828.
88. Ch. 2000-302, § 55, 2000 Fa. Laws 3129, 3147 (codified at FIA. STAT.
§ 718.115 (2000)).
89. Id. § 56,2000 Fla. Laws at 3149 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116(2000)).
90. Ch. 2000-201, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2040, 2040 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116
(2000)).
91. 240 B.R. 788 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
92. Id. at 790.
93. Id.
2000]
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began work on the protective canopy, which was the source of the dispute.94
Sunshine became concerned about the quality and quantity of the bracing.
95
After an unsuccessful conference with the contractor, it hired a structural
engineer who found the design questionable and the construction
substandard.96 The contractor claimed the construction was completed, or at
least ninety percent completed, and refused to remedy the problems or
remove the canopy. 97 Sunshine terminated the contract.9s It then hired a
structural engineer to make new drawings for the canopy and remove and
replace the old one.99
The court decided that Florida law applied and the first step should be
to determine if the case was controlled by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").1°°  Construction contracts are typically
dominated by the services element rather than by the provision of goods for
the construction.' 01 Consequently, the court applied contract law and not the
U.C.C. to the damages and breach issues. 02
Under Florida law, Sunshine would have been entitled to terminate the
contract if the contractor had materially breached.' °3 It found that the
primary purpose of the canopy was to have a safe and operational -self-
service station.1' The canopy was intended to provide protection for the
customers and the gas tanks.105 A dangerous canopy would defeat the
purpose of the contract.1 6 The contractor did not produce a safe canopy
and, in fact, showed no concern about doing so.1°7 It treated the drawings
and the code requirements as mere formalities to be circumvented.1
8
Moreover, the contractor was given ample opportunities to remedy the
94. Id. at 791.
95. Id. at 792.
96. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 793.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 794.
100. Id.
101. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 794.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id.
106. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 795.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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deficiencies and refused. 0 9 The contractor was in breach and the termina-
tion of the contract was justified.'1
Under the circumstances, Sunshine was entitled to be put in the position
it expected to be in under the contract."1 So long as it did not constitute
unreasonable economic waste, Sunshine could recover what it cost to get the
construction it had bargained for.1 2 Here, Sunshine had expected to get the
work done for $67,500 and it had already paid $25,000 to the contractor 13
To get the job completed properly, it had to pay the structural engineer
$62,608.12.1 4 Consequently, Sunshine was entitled to recover $20,108 so
that its total cost would not exceed the original price.'15
Sunshine also sought lost profits.11 6 To recover lost profits it would
have to prove that the contractor's breach had caused that loss and there had
to be a standard for calculating the amount of damages.' 17 The evidence was
insufficient to meet the test.1" Even if the pumps had been operational on
schedule, the inside of the store was still being remodeled during the period
when lost profits were sought. 9 So the amount of profits which might have
been attributable to the inoperable pumps could not be determined.17
V. CONVERSION AND MERGER OF BUSINESS ENTTIES
Legislation now provides that there is no need to record a deed for title
to transfer by merger or conversion of business entities.
12
'
VI. COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS
Boyce v. Simpson.1' - The issue here was whether the trial court
properly denied Boyce's request for a permanent injunction against the
109. Id. at 796.
110. Id.
111. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 796.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 797.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Ch. 2000-298, § 7, 2000 Fla. Laws 2940, 2942 (creating FLA. STAT. § 694.16
(2000)).
122. 746 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
20001
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Simpsons' proposed use of their dwelling as an Adult Congregate Living
Facility ("ACLF'). 12
The Simpsons purchased their single family dwelling to both live in and
to operate as an ACLF for up to six non-family members as allowed by
sections 419.01 and 400.401 of the Florida Statutes.12 The Boyces objected
to the use of the home as an ACLF and sought to enforce the applicable
restrictive covenant within their residential neighborhood.125 The covenant
provided:
USE RESTRICTIONS. Lots may be used for dwelling units and
pertinent uses and for no other purposes. No business buildings
may be erected in the subdivision and no business may be
conducted on any part thereof, nor shall any dwelling unit or any
portion thereof be used or maintained as a professional office.1
The dispute centered around "whether the phrase 'on any part there-
of applies to the term 'business building' or the word 'subdivision.'"1 27 The
trial court denied the request for the permanent injunction ruling that any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the homeowner.'2
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in denying the
request for the permanent injunction. 129 This was based on the fact that
restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed in favor of the
homeowners.
1 30
Loren v. Sasser.131 The issue here was whether to grant an amended
motion for a preliminary injunction on Loren's First Amendment claim to be
allowed to place a "for sale" sign on her property without violating the
community's judicially enforceable deed restriction ban on all homeowner
signs.
132
The court had previously recognized that judicial enforcement in
Florida of rules and restrictions banning or restricting free speech constitutes
123. Id. at 508.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis supplied).
127. Boyce, 746 So. 2d at 508.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see Palma v. Townhouses of Oriole Ass'n, 610 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Ha. 5th Dist. CL App. 1989).
131. 13 Ha. L. Weekly Fed. D241 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2000).
132. Id. at D241.
[Vol. 25:115
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state action. 33 Therefore, the constitutional validity of the speech ban or
restriction is properly subject to federal scrutiny under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in an action under section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code.
134
The court denied the amended motion for preliminary injunction. 35 It
reasoned that Loren had not met the burden of showing it would suffer
irreparable harm absent the Association's being enjoined from interfering
with her First Amendment rights to place a "for sale" sign on her property.
VII. DEEDS
Griem v. Zabala.137 The question was whether the trial court erred
when it denied a quiet title petition involving two condominium units, when
the sellers of one unit did not sign the deed and had not met or been in the
presence of the notary who notarized the deed, and for the second unit, the
grantees did not introduce the deed into evidence or adequately explain why
it was missing.
138
In 1978, Griem purchased condominium unit numbers 106 and 110, the
units at issue.139 After his wife's death, Griem quitclaimed these units to
himself and his two daughters. 40 Afterwards, Griem entered into an
agreement with a real estate agent to manage, maintain, and rent the units.
14 1
From 1980 to 1989, Griem visited Miami annually to check on the properties
and receive statements from the real estate agent as to the properties'
status.' 42 These reports stopped in 1989.143 From 1989 to 1996, Griem did
not visit Miami due to health and business problems.1M  Additionally, Griem
owned six other condominium units located in Pointe South which were also
133. See Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884, 887 (M.D.
Fla. 1989).
134. Id.
135. Loren, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D241.
136. Id.; see Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
137. 744 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
138. Id. at 1140.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
143. Id.
144. Id.
2000]
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managed by the real estate agent' 45 These units were severely damaged by
Hurricane Andrew and "[t]here were no reserve funds nor incoming rents to
pay the mortgage and maintenance assessments" on these units.146 Allegedly,
the real estate agent sold units 106 and 110 to avoid foreclosure on the other
units. 147 In 1996, Griem came to Miami and discovered the units in question
had been transferred to the Zabalas and to the Moraleses without his consent
or knowledge.14 Further, he stated that he did not sign any deeds or powers
of attorney. 149 Griem filed suit to quiet title, to eject the Zabalas and the
Moraleses, and to obtain declaratory relief against them.15 The trial court
entered final judgment for the Zabalas and the Moraleses. 15 1
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in holding that the
Zabalas and Moraleses had valid deeds to units 106 and 110.5 2 For there to
be a transfer of a property interest, "a deed must be in writing and signed by
the person conveying such interest.'1 53 Further, section 117.05(6)(a) of the
Florida Statutes prohibits a notary to notarize a signature if the person is not
in his or her presence at the time the signature is notarized.154 The notary in
this case testified that she did not know Griem and he was not in her
presence when she notarized the deed. 55 Therefore, the Zabalas did not
have a valid deed for unit 106.156 Section 90.952 of the Florida Statutes
requires the offering of an original writing or a sufficient explanation for its
unavailability 5 7 The Moraleses failed to introduce their deed into evidence
or adequately explain its absence.' 58 Therefore, there was no evidence to
support a finding that the Moraleses owned unit 110.159
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
153. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (2000).
154. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140; see also FLA STAT. § 117.05(6)(a) (2000); The Fla.
Bar v. Farinas, 608 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1992).
155. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
156. Id.
157. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2000).
158. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1141.
159. Id.
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VII. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Alternative Networking, Inc. v. Solid Waste Authority.IW The Authority
condemned a building that was partially occupied by tenants. 161 Three of
those tenants had been found by Alternative Networking under a contract
with the landowner that gave it fifteen percent of the monthly rents paid by
any tenants it procured for as long as they remained tenants. 62 Alternative
Networking sought part of the condemnation award on the theory that it had
a property interest, but the district court disagreed. 63 It characterized the
interest as merely a personal contract. 64 Alternative Networking was not the
beneficiary of a covenant that ran with the land because the covenant was
only binding between Alternative Networking and the landowner. 165
Alternative Networking did not have any land that was benefited by the
contract. 66 It could not enforce its right to payment by a lien on the land and
any tenant could terminate its lease upon giving proper notice. 67 By its
terms, the lease lasted only as long as a tenant remained on the land, so the
loss of the land in condemnation terminated Alternative Networking's right
to payment.' 68
Brevard County v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc.'69 The county had obtained an
order to take 240 acres of Duda's land for the construction of artificial
wetlands.170 After the order was entered, the county realized that it needed
an easement for the flow of partially treated wastewater from those artificial
wetlands to Lake Winder by way of a canal owned by Duda. 17 1 So the
county filed an amended complaint to acquire the easement..172  In
determining the value of the easement, there was evidence that the
government was considering more stringent pollution limits on water
160. 758 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
161. Id. at 1210.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1211.
164. Id.
165. Alternative Networking, Inc., 758 So. 2d at 1211.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1212.
169. 742 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
170. Id. at 477.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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flowing into Lake Winder from Duda's canal.173 The effect of the county
adding contaminants from its artificial wetlands, while the total
contaminants allowed was reduced, would be to limit the amount of
contaminants that could flow into the canal from Duda's land; and that could
"substantially impact Duda's operations and future development of its Cocoa
Ranch."' 74
The county attempted to reduce the amount of compensation ordered by
having the taking order place restrictions on its use of the easement.' 75 Both
parties submitted proposed language and the trial court adopted the county's
version.176 Duda appealed and the district court reversed, finding that the
fatal error in the language adopted was that it would "exceed the plans,
specifications and testimony presented at the hearing on the order of taking,
and attempt to impose contractual obligations.., in the absence of a
contractual agreement. ' 177  In addition, from Duda's perspective, the
contractual language was so vague that future litigation to interpret it would
be inevitable." The court concluded that "[tihe condemnee is entitled to
just compensation now.., not vague promises to act in the future to cure
future problems in an attempt to limit compensation.
179
Claussen v. Department of Transportation. Ig In this condemnation
proceeding, the DOT sought to reduce its liability by showing that the
landowner knew that a part of the land might be taken in a road widening
project. 8' On the stand, the landowner denied he had such knowledge.', 2
The DOT then produced a letter that had been written by an attorney to the
DOT two years earlier complaining about the proposed road widening. 83 At
the time the letter was written, the attorney represented the prior
landowner.184 Later, that attorney represented the current landowner in
173. ld. at 478.
174. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 478.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 479.
179. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 479.
180. 750 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
181. ld. at 80.
182. Id. at 81.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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negotiations for the land's purchase. 8 5 On appeal, the district court found
the use of the letter so tainted the trial that reversal was necessary. 18
The DOT claimed that the letter was used for impeachment purposes
and, therefore, it had no obligation to disclose the letter during discovery. 87
The district court rejected both assertions.' 88  A witness can only be
impeached by the witness's prior inconsistent statement.189 This letter was
written by another person, so it could not be used for impeachment.' 9° Even
if it could, disclosure in discovery would be necessary to avoid trial by
ambush, which is contrary to the current theory of civil litigation. 9
The DOT also claimed that the letter was admissible as a public
record.'9 The district court rejected this argument because the letter was
based on information from an outside source.193  There is a hearsay
exception that allows an agency to "present proof of its activities by utilizing
its records or reports that demonstrate compliance by a government agency
with duties it was lawfully required to perform." 194 That was not what the
letter was used for in this case.
The court also rejected the DOT's claim that the letter was properly
used to refresh the witness's memory. 196 However, the statute allows such
use only when the witness expresses an inability to remember something.1 97
Here, the witness made no such statement. 98 To the contrary, he specifically
denied ever having knowledge of the road widening project.199 Moreover,
even if the letter had been properly used to refresh the witness's memory, the
DOT still could not publish the letter's contents to the jury as was done in
this case.2 In fact, the DOT's lawyer went even further and "also provided
his own interpretation of its substance in the jury's presence."2' Such action
185. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
186. Id. at 80.
187. Id. at 81.
188. Id. at 81-82.
189. Id. at 81.
190. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 81; see FLA. STAT. § 90.606 (2000).
193. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2000).
198. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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was intended to prejudice the jury.2 Consequently, the landowner had been
denied his constitutional right to a jury trial.203
CSR Partnership v. Department of Transportation.2°4 The DOT made
an offer of judgment.205 Under Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure the offer of judgment was served too late. M6 Under section
73.032 of the Florida Statutes the service was timely because it requires
service no later than twenty days before trial.207 The circuit court applied the
statute, but the district court reversed.2°8 It stated that "the supreme court
has previously found that time limits for offers of judgment are
procedural." 2 9 While the legislature has primary authority over substantive
matters, the court has primary authority over procedural matters.210 Thus,
the rules promulgated by the supreme court, rather than the statute, control
the timing of offers of judgment. 21
Department of Transportation v. Duplissey. The landowner sought
severance damages.213 The DOT admitted liability and made a good faith
deposit with the court.2 14 At trial, the landowner succeeded in excluding the
215proffered testimony of the DOT's expert. The jury had only the testimony
of the landowner's expert to consider in determining the severance damages,
216but arrived at a figure that was lower than what the expert had calculated.217
In fact, it was lower than the good faith deposit. Faced with a case of first
218impression, the trial court granted the landowner's motion for a new trial .
219The district court, however, reversed 9. If the jury had the good faith
deposit amount to consider, it would have been required to consider that the
202. Id.
203. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
204. 741 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
205. Id. at 625.
206. Id; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.442 (requiring service no later than 45 days before trial).
207. CSR P'ship, 741 So. 2d at 623; see FLA. STAT § 73.032 (2000).
208. CSR P'ship, 741 So. 2d at 623.
209. Id. (citing Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996)).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 624.
212. 751 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
213. Id. at 118.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 119.
217. Duplissey, 751 So. 2dat 119.
218. Id. at 118.
219. Id. at 119.
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minimum award.m However, the.only evidence before the jury was the
landowner's expert's testimony.221 The jury was not bound by that and
could, based on the facts before it, reach its own conclusion.222 Here, the
conclusion was for a lesser amount of severance damages.2 3 Excluding the
DOT's expert's testimony had backfired.
Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd.Y The county
engaged in a road widening project that required taking part of the parking
lot owned by Cumberland Farms.225 At that time, Cumberland Farms had
two tenants, Deis and Hancock Company.n6 Deis' original written lease had
expired and he was under a month-to-month lease.2 27 Hancock was under an
extension of its original leasem After the filing of the condemnation action,
Cumberland Farms notified these tenants that their leases would not be
renewed because it was going to build a new and bigger store.Y9 However,
but for the condemnation, the leases would have been renewed at least for
the indefinite future.m
In the condemnation proceeding, the tenants sought business
damages.23' Their expert witness was allowed to testify about their business
damages calculated on the theory that their leases would be continually
232renewed for the indefinite future. He based this on the past history of
renewals. 3 The district court found that the admission of this testimony
was error.n4 A tenant is entitled to recover business damages based only
upon its leasehold interest at the time of the taking.2 s Thus, Deis, who had a
220. Id.
221. Id. at 118.
222. Duplissey, 751 So. 2d at 120.
223. Id.
224. 743 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The original opinion was
withdrawn following the grant of a motion to supplement the record and review of the
supplemental materials. See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, 1999 Survey of
Florida Law: Real Property, 24 NOvA L. REv. 267, 297 (1999); Seminole County v. Sanford
Court Investors, Ltd., 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1056 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999).
225. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1167.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1168.
231. Id. at 1167.
232. Id. at 1168.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1169.
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month-to-month lease, was entitled to business damages suffered over a one-
month period, and Hancock was entitled to business damages for what
remained of its two-year term.
236
The tenants' claim for moving expenses was found to be without
merit.237  Moving expenses could be recovered "if the tenants] [are]
required to move [their] possessions off the property or to move them from
one part of the property to another as a result of the taking." 238 There was no
evidence indicating that had occurred here.239
In order to vacate the premises, the tenants had auctioned off their
inventory and trade fixtures. The tenants had suffered a loss because the
auction prices were so low and their expert had included this loss in his
calculation of business damages. 24' That was an error. 242 Recovery for the
trade fixtures would be severance damages, not business damages.2 ' The
jury was not given a special verdict form that separated severance damages
from business damages.2"4  Consequently, the case was reversed and
remanded.245
M.J. Stavola Farms, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.246 This case
involved the partial taking of land that had been leased out as a limerock
mine.247 The expert for the tenant testified that the tenant would suffer
business damages calculated on the amount of limerock located in the taken
land.2m The landowners and lessees appealed based on the trial judge's
order to strike that testimonr. The district court disagreed and held that the
trial court had not erred.24  The testimony revealed that the tenant had
consistently been removing about six hundred thousand tons of limerock per
year and that there was no evidence that it would ever mine more than that
annual amount?' 0 At the current rate, the tenant could continue to remove
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1171.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1170.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd, 743 So. 2d at 1171.
246. 742 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
247. Id. at 392-93.
248. Id. at 394.
249. Id. at 395.
250. Id. at 393.
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limerock for the next twenty-five years without being affected by the
taking.2 51 In year twenty-six the tenant would run out of limerock and suffer
business damages for the remaining nineteen years of the lease . At the
current rate, the tenant would never have removed all the limerock in the
taken land, so its business damages should not have been calculated on all
the limerock in the taken land. 53 Its business damages should only have
been calculated on its income from the limerock it would have removed in
the last nineteen years, but for the taking.254 Basing business damages on the
possibility that the tenant might begin removing limerock at a faster rate
would be speculation, and damages cannot be based on speculation.
2 55
Owens v. Orange County.26 The county brought this condemnation as
part of a road widening project.2" The landowners claimed business
damages and hired a certified public accountant as their business damages
expert.258  The parties reached a mediated settlement with two
components.259 First, the landowners would be paid $90,000 in full
settlement of all claims except attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and costs. °
Second, the county would make certain improvements to the landowners'
remaining property.261 The landowners filed a motion for expert fees due to
their business damages expert, but the county objected, arguing that the
landowners had abandoned their claim for business damages based on an
inference from the amount of the settlement.262 The statute provided for
payment of a reasonable accountant's fee only when business damages were
compensable.263 Accepting that argument, the trial court denied the
motion. 2"
The district court, however, reversed, finding that there had never been
an express abandonment of business damages.2 The nature of the
251. M.J. Stavola Farms, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 395.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 747 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
257. Id. at 467.
258. Id. at468.
259. Id. at 467.
260. Id.
261. Owens, 747 So. 2d at 467.
262. Id. at 468.
263. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (2000).
264. Owens, 747 So. 2d at 469.
265. Id. at 470.
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settlement indicated that the county was to make the promised improvements
to avoid having to pay business damages. 2 6 Accepting an alternative to
money did not suggest abandonment of the claim. 2 6 Rather, it suggested
268that the claim was compromised. Lawyers would be well advised to avoid
similar disputes in the future by expressly addressing the abandonment issue
in the settlement agreement.
B. Inverse Condemnation
Burnham v. Monroe County.269 The county adopted a "Rate of Growth
Ordinance" that limited the number of building permits that could be
issued. 27 A point system existed to allocate the permits. 271 Points could be
earned by including certain design features, such as solar hot water heaters
or low flow plumbing fixtures.272 These landowners unsuccessfully sought a
building permit.273 They were repeatedly informed by the county that a few
design changes would give them a high enough score to get the permit, but
they declined to make the changes and instead brought this suit.274 The
circuit court found the ordinance constitutional and that no taking had
275 276
occurred. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. The ordinance
was constitutional because it "substantially advance[d] the legitimate state
interests of promoting water conservation, windstorm protection, energy
efficiency, growth control, and habitat protection. '277 Moreover, to prevail
on their claim that a taking had occurred, the landowners had the burden of
showing "that the challenged regulation denies all economically beneficial,,27829
or productive use of land. They failed to make that showing.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 738 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
270. Id. at 472.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 472 n. 1.
273. Id. at 472.
274. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
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Saboff v. St. John's River Water Management District.280 As mandated
by the Florida legislature, the Water Management District created Riparian
Habitat Protection Zones.281 The landowners' land was in one of these
zones. 28 2 Consequently, in order to build a residence, the landowners needed
a permit from the District, but the District would issue the permit only if the
landowners would mitigate the loss of wildlife habitat caused by the
construction. 28 3 The District demanded a conservation easement over part of
the landowners' undeveloped land.2 4  The landowners complied but
challenged the requirement by filing suit in state court claiming inverse
condemnation, denial of substantive due process, and denial of equal
protection.281 The District removed the case to federal court based on
federal question jurisdiction and then moved to dismiss the federal due
process and equal protection claims as unripe.286  The landowners
voluntarily dismissed their federal claims and the case was remanded to state
court which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. 28 7 The district
court of appeal affirmed.288 The landowners next filed suit in federal court
claiming denial of their federal substantive due process and equal protection
rights.28 The District's defense was that these claims were barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. 290
Two rules created a dilemma for the landowners. A federal court
plaintiff is required "to pursue any available state court remedies that might
lead to just compensation prior to bringing suit in federal court for a takings
claim." However, res judicata prevents a party from bringing a claim in292
federal court that has already been litigated in state court. The dismissal
of the landowners' claims was an adjudication on the merits against the
landowner.293 The doctrine of res judicata in Florida "'bars subsequent
litigation where there is (1) identity of the thing sued for, (2) identity of the
280. 200 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2000).
281. Id. at 1358.
282. Id. at 1359.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1358.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1359.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1360.
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cause of action, (3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and (4)
identity of the quality or capacity of the person for or against whom the
claim is made."' 294 Of the four, there was only a question as to whether
there was identity of cause of action, but the court decided it existed since
the facts underlying the federal and state claims were identical.295
To avoid state court litigation preventing any subsequent federal claim,
a narrow exception to res judicata has been created. To claim the exception,
the landowner had to make a "Jennings reservation" by expressly reserving
on the state court records the federal claims for subsequent litigation in
federal court.296 The landowners, however, had not reserved their rights on
the record.297 Their assertions that there was an off the record agreement or
that the reservation was implicit were not enough to satisfy the rule and
qualify for the exception. 29 8
Department of Transportation v. S. W. Anderson, Inc.29 A bridge
building project resulted in the relocation of a state road. 300 The landowner
claimed that the effect of the relocation was the loss of access to its
commercial property, amounting to a taking and entitling it to
compensation. 3°1 The claim encountered two roadblocks. First, the
plaintiffs land did not abut the state road.3°2  The landowner tried to
establish abutter's status by claiming it had an easement by reason of
necessity to the state road across a neighbor's land.303 However, that
easement had not previously been established and it could not be established
in this litigation because the servient landowner was not a party. 3 04 Thus, the
landowner had failed to establish this crucial element of its case.
305
Even if this case involved land abutting the state road, the landowner
had failed to demonstrate that its access had been substantially
diminished.3 3'6 That is a factual determination, but it requires a showing of
294. Id. (citing Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (lth Cir.
1997)).
295. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1360.
296. Id.; see Jennings v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976).
297. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1360.
298. Id.
299. 744 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
300. Id. at 1098.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1099.
303. Id.
304. S.W. Anderson, Inc., 744 So. 2d at 1099.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1102.
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more than a change to a less convenient route or a diminished flow of traffic
passing by.3 The plaintiff here showed that getting from the state road to
its front door involved more turns and increased distance, but that was not
enough.
308
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc.309 The issue
here was a challenge to an order of the Department of Environmental Protec-
tion ("DEP") denying Coastal's application for a drilling permit "because oil
extraction is potentially too dangerous to the environment.,, 310 Coastal con-
tended that the order was unconstitutional because the DEP's interpretation
of the applicable statute was an unconstitutional taking of its property.
3 11
The statute at issue here was section 377.241 of the Florida Statutes,
which gives the following three criteria to guide the DEP when issuing
permits:
(1) The nature, character and location of the lands involved;
whether rural, such as farms, groves, or ranches, or urban property
vacant or presently developed for residential or business purposes
or are in such a location or of such a nature as to make such
improvements and developments a probability in the near future.
(2) The nature, type and extent of ownership of the applicant,
including such matters as the length of time the applicant has
owned the rights claimed without having performed any of the
exploratory operations so granted or authorized.
(3) The proven or indicated likelihood of the presence of oil, gas or
related minerals in such quantities as to warrant the exploration and
extraction of such products on a commercially profitable basis.
312
Coastal argued that in the past the DEP had issued permits when all three of
these criteria were met.3 13 Yet, when the DEP announced its intention to
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 766 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
310. Id. at 227.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 227-28; FLA. STAT. § 377.241 (2000).
313. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228.
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issue a permit in this case, due to the environmental groups challenging the
decision, the DEP reconsidered its past practice and stated that just meeting
the criteria was not legally sufficient, but that this must be balanced against
the danger to the coastal environment.3"4
The court held that the DEP correctly determined that its previous
practice was not consistent with the proper interpretation of the statute and
that the DEP had adequately explained why it made this determination.315
Further, the court held that Coastal did have a contract to explore for and
extract oil from submerged sovereignty lands, but that the DEP's action was
316
not unconstitutional unless just compensation is not paid. Therefore, the
matter was to be resolved in circuit court.
3 17
X. FORECLOSURE
318
Ahmad v. Cobb Corner, Inc. The question here was whether a
mortgagee holding guarantees as collateral is entitled to a deficiency
judgment when he has sold the property and made a reasonable return on his
investment.31 9
In this case, the mortgagee, Ahmad, purchased the note and mortgage in
a pool of loans. 3 20 When the mortgagor, Cobb Comer, defaulted, the
mortgagee sued for foreclosure, purchasing the property for $100 in the
foreclosure sale.32' Six months later, the mortgagee sold the property for
$775,000.322 The mortgagee then filed for a deficiency judgment against the
guarantors, Resolution Trust Corporation.?
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the return on investment
made cannot be the determining factor as to a mortgagee's right to
recover.324 The court also held that the mortgagee is entitled to recover the
314. Id.
315. Id.; see FLA. STAT § 120.68(12) (2000). Cf. Dep't of Admin. v. Albanese, 445 So.
2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding "the Department, however, possesses only
such authority as is specifically delegated to it by statute and cannot promulgate rules that go
beyond that grant of authority or are contrary to the intent of the legislature").
316. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
317. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228.
318. 762 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
319. Id. at 945.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 945-46.
322. Id. at 946.
323. Ahmad, 762 So. 2d at 946.
324. Id. at 947.
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entire contract amount through any avenue available to him and his recovery
is not limited by the amount he has invested.325
Bowman v. Saltsman.326 The issue here was whether the trial court
properly granted Saltsman's request to reform deeds previously given, and
properly denied Bowman's purchaser any relief, thereby denyg Bowman
his right of redemption because foreclosure was not required.32 8
Bowman desired an easement across Saltsman's property.32s However,
"Saltsman would not convey an easement but agreed to sell the entire parcel
to Bowman if the deal could be arranged as a tax free exchange." 329 They
entered into an agreement for deed under which Bowman would pay
$425,000 to a trustee who would purchase property desired by Saltsman. 33
When all the money had been paid, Bowman would get legal title to the
property.331 At that time Saltsman would get the property he desired with no
332tax consequence. Bowman made over $300,000 in payments before
breaching.333 Saltsman claimed ownership of both parcels and filed an
action to reform certain deeds pursuant to the agreement, instead of
declaring a default and foreclosing the mortgage.3 4  Bowman
counterclaimed for, among other things, specific performance of the land
contract.335 The trial court found Bowman had defaulted by not maldng all
the payments that were due, denied him relief, and granted Saltsman's
request to reform the deeds.336 Bowman was denied his right of redemption
because foreclosure was not required.337
The appellate court held the agreement for deed was a mortgage and
carried all the burdens of such, including the right of redemption. 338 Since
Bowman's equitable interest in the land had not been foreclosed and
Bowman sought to resume payments under the agreement, even though he
325. Id.
326. 736 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1999).
327. Id. at 146.
328. Id. at 145.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Bowman, 736 So. 2d at 145.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 146.
335. Id. at 145.
336. Bowman, 736 So. 2d at 145.
337. Id. at 146.
338. Id.
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had defaulted, his rights needed to be enforced under the agreement.339 The
appellate court emphasized that "the secured party may either waive the
default or declare a default and foreclose," but cannot "treat the default as an
automatic termination of the buyer's interest."
340
Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc.341 The issue here was whether the
Third District Court of Appeal properly held that section 702.10(2) of the
Florida Statutes, which allows a commercial mortgagee to request a court
order requiring the mortgagor to continue payments pending litigation, post
bond, or relinquish possession of the property, is unconstitutional because it
does not adequately protect the due process rights of the mortgagor and
impermissibly conflicts with the supreme court's rulemaking authority.
342
Tuttle purchased a plant nursery from Caple for a price of seventeen
million dollars. 343  "The purchase was financed by a bank, with three
promissory notes to Caple Enterprises, and one promissory note to George
Caple." 3" Tuttle subsequently defaulted on one of the notes to Caple
Enterprises and the one note to George Caple.345 Caple filed an action for
foreclosure and requested, pursuant to section 702.10(2) of the Florida
Statutes, an order to show cause. 346 Tuttle answered asserting various
affirmative defenses.347 The court ordered Tuttle to either pay Caple interest
retroactive to the date of the request of the order or alternatively post a bond
in the amount of $6,865,572, which was the amount of the unpaid mortgage
principal and interest. 8
Tuttle appealed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision.349 The
Third District found the statute unconstitutional under the United States and
Florida Constitutions, "because it forces a mortgagor who wants to retain
possession of the property to make payments without due process protection
in the form of a mortgagee's bond or sequestration."350 Further, the court
held that "because it only provides for an excessive bond to stay the
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 753 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2000).
342. Id. at 50.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 50.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at51.
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payments, that the section impermissibly regulates matters of practice and
procedure."
351
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 702.10(2) of the
Florida Statutes was constitutional based on two analyses. 352 First, "[it is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that, if at all possible, a statute
should be construed to be constitutional. 353 The supreme court opined that,
based on the totality of the statute as a whole, this statute gives some
flexibility to the court and, therefore, does not violate due process rights. 354
Further, the court stated that if the statute is 'substantive and that it operates
in an area of legitimate legislative concern,"' it is "precluded from finding it
unconstitutional. 355 Substantive law has been defined to include the "rules
and principles which fix and declare the pim y rights of individuals with
respect towards their persons and property.' The Supreme Court of
Florida held the statute "created substantive rights and any procedural
provisions [were] directly related to the definition of those rights." 357
Therefore, the statute does not infringe on the court's rulemaking authority
and is constitutional.358
Edwards v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.359 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly calculated the deficiency judgment amount
in a foreclosure when it failed to reduce the property's fair market value by
the amount of delinquent ad valorem taxes.3r°
The appellate court concluded the trial court failed to follow proper
procedure in this case by not including the amount of unpaid ad valorem
taxes in its deficiency calculation. 361 The Fourth District further held the
trial court has discretion with respect to granting or denying a deficiency
judgment.362 "However, granting a deficiency judgment is more the rule
than the exception.s 363
351. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 51.
352. Id.
353. Id.; see VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880, 883
(Fla. 1983).
354. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 52-53.
355. Id. at 53 (citing VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883).
356. Id. at 54 (citing Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1981)).
357. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 55.
358. Id.
359. 746 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
360. Id. at 1157.
361. Id. at 1158.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1157; see Chidnese v. McCollem, 695 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
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Further, the court held that "'[e]quitable considerations upon which the
trial court might deny a deficiency should be presented after the potential
deficiency is determined (amount of judgment on note less fair market value
of property). ' ,'364  Prior to that "'the trial court would not be able to
determine what set-off might be appropriate.' ' 365 Pursuant to this case, the
appellate court remanded for recalculation of the deficiency amount after
which the appellants might appeal the deficiency judgment. 36
Hamilton v. Hughes. 36  The issue here was whether the trial court
properly awarded excess mortgage foreclosure sale proceeds to Hughes and
no portion of the excess sale proceeds to Hamilton.
36F
The action started with Chase Manhattan Mortgages Corporation's
("Chase") mortgage foreclosure complaint.369 Originally, Hamilton and her
former husband had mortgaged their property to Chase during their
marriage. 37  Later, the couple divorced and the husband defaulted on the
$26,000 mortgage.371  Further, Dolphin Hamilton, the former husband,
obtained a mortgage from the Hughes after the dissolution of the marriage.
372
This mortgage was only signed by Dolphin Hamilton.37 The Hughes agreed
to pay Chase $31,000 for assignment of the first mortgage. Hamilton
received copies of all significant filings in this case and did not make any
appearance through the trial.375 Yet, she did inform the court by letter that
she could not afford an attorney but claimed a fifty percent interest in the
encumbered property.376 The property sold for more than the outstanding
mortgages held by the Hughes. The trial court made disbursements to the
Hughes and the state to satisfy the amounts owed to them.378 It retained
$5600 in excess funds.379 The Hughes requested a disbursement of $5500 to
364. Id. at 1158.
365. Edwards, 746 So. 2d at 1158 (quoting Chidnese, 695 So. 2d at 938).
366. Id.
367. 737 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
368. Id. at 1249.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1249.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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them and $100 to Hamilton. ° Hamilton filed a response noting her half
interest in the property and that she and her former husband had owned the
property as tenants in common, requesting $3338.381
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that Hamilton should be
awarded the entire $5600 in excess proceeds.382 It reasoned that "one tenant
in common cannot properly sell or dispose of more than his or her own
interest in the common property to a third person unless authorized to do
so.'
3 83
Further, the Second District held that foreclosure defendants who failed
to answer the first foreclosure complaint do not waive their right to excess
proceeds.3" Because Hamilton only contested the $5500 disbursement, that
was all that was reviewed.3 8 5  The Hughes had constructive notice of
Hamilton's interest in the property.386 Thus, their contention that they relied
on her silence was not valid.3
Mody v. California Federal Bank.388 The issue here was whether the
trial court properly concluded, when it vacated the sale of foreclosed
property, that the foreclosure sale bid was grossly inadequate and that the
inadequacy resulted from a mistake by the bank.
38 9
On February 19, 1999, the bank's bidding agent attended a foreclosure
sale with the intention of bidding up to $239,200 on the subject property.390
The bidding agent was to bid on three other pieces of property at the
foreclosure sale.391 But, the agent failed to bid on the property because he
had been furnished a different case name.3 2 Mody and Cava were the
highest bidders with a bid of $202,000. 393 The bank filed an objection to the
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250.
383. Id. (citing 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 138); see Cadle Co. H v. Stauffenberg,
581 N.E.2d 882, 884 (11. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "where a cotenant who owns
less than the entire interest attempts to mortgage the whole, the mortgage is valid [only] as to
the actual interest [of the mortgagor]").
384. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250; see Schroth v. Cape Coral Bank, 377 So. 2d 50,51
(Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1979).
385. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1251.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 747 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
389. Id. at 1017.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1017.
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sale and moved to have it vacated because the Mody and Cava bid was
grossly inadequate. 94 The trial court was presented with several different
values for the property.395
Mody and Cava's expert valued the property at $225,000.396  The
bank's expert valued the property at $300,000. 97 The property's assessed
398value for tax purposes was $252,612. On June 22, 1999, the trial court
entered an order vacating the foreclosure sale and ordering a new sale.
399
The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was error to vacate the
foreclosure sale bid where it was not shown that the bid was grossly or
startlingly inadequate. 4w In order to vacate a foreclosure sale the trial court
is required to find that "the foreclosure sale bid was grossly or startlingly
inadequate" and "the inadequacy of the bid resulted from some mistake,
fraud or other irregularity in the sale." ' The court noted that the Supreme
Court of Florida had found that a foreclosure bid of seventy percent of the
value of the property is not a startling inadequacy.4m Further, the Third
District Court of Appeal had similarly found that a foreclosure sale bid of
seventy-two percent of the value of the foreclosed property is not startlingly
or grossly inadequate.4° 3 Here, even though the trial court did not assign the
property one of the proposed values, that was not necessary. 4" Even if the
highest appraisal value of $300,000 was used, the foreclosure bid price was
67.3% and was not grossly or startling inadequate.4°5 Further, if one of the
other possible values of $225,000 or $252,612 were used, the foreclosure bid
would have been 89.8% or 80% respectively.
406
Parsons v. Whitaker Plumbing of Boca Raton, Inc.4w The issue here
was whether the trial court properly amended its foreclosure judgment on a
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1017.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1018.
401. Id. at 1017-18; see Arlt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1996); Maule
Indus., Inc. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1956).
402. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018; see Maule Indus., Inc., 91 So. 2d at 311.
403. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018; see Moody v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 643 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
404. See Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 751 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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mechanics' lien to include attorneys' fees after the judgment debtors already
exercised their right of redemption for the judgment entered for labor and
material provided by the mechanic's lienor 40
8
Whitaker filed an action against Parsons and DeFalco to foreclose on a
mechanics' lien for plumbing work performed on Parsons' and DeFalco's
property.4 9 On March 24, 1998, the trial court entered a final judgment of
foreclosure, finding that Whitaker held a lien for $3117.43, including
interests and costs on Parson's property.410 On April 22, 1998, Parson and
DeFalco "exercised their statutory right of redemption by paying the total
amount due under the March 24 final judgment of foreclosure, plus a clerk's
fee."4' The clerk issued a certificate of redemption. 412 "On August 6,
1998... the court entered an amended final judgment of foreclosure,
awarding Whitaker $12,000 in attorney's fees and setting a foreclosure sale
to satisfy this debt.",41
3
The Fourth District Court of Appeal determined the entry of an
amended foreclosure judgment for attorneys' fees was proper procedurally
and in correct form. Parsons and DeFalco, exercising their redemption
rights regarding the first judgment, did not preclude the trial court from
entering the second judgment. The redemption only satisfied the specified
debt in the first judgment and not the liability for the attorneys' fees which
remained unpaid as of August 6, 1998.416 Whitaker sought to foreclose a
lien created by section 713.05 of the Florida Statutes.417 When there is an
action to foreclose this type of lien, "'the prevailing party is entitled to
recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and
appeal... in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be
taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs, as allowed in equitable
actions." 8 Attorneys' fees and costs awarded under section 713.29 are
included within the lien which is created by the statute.419
408. Id. at 655.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Parsons, 751 So. 2d at 655.
413. id.
414. Id. at 657.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Parsons, 751 So. 2d at 656.
418. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (2000)).
419. Id. at 656; Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc., 700 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (examining section 713.06(1) of the Florida Statutes). The language
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Texas Commerce Bank National Ass'n v. Nathanson420 In this case
there was a request for a rehearing which was denied.421  However, the
appellate court issued a clarification of its original opinion.422
The issue here was whether the trial court properly ruled that the clerk
did not err when he refused to accept the highest bid in a foreclosure sale on
the grounds that the bidder, Texas Commerce Bank National Association
("TCBNA"), tendered a law firm check rather than cash for the clerk's
fee. 23 The trial court overruled TCBNA's objection to the foreclosure
sale.4U
TCBNA offered the highest bid at $151,000 for a piece of property
sought by both TCBNA and Jupiter Assets.425 Jupiter Assets "objected to
TCBNA paying the $40 clerk's fee for the sale with a law firn cost account
check as opposed to cash."426 The deputy clerk on the scene refused to
accept the check and Jupiter Assets was declared the successful bidder.4 27
TCBNA filed motions to correct the mistake and the trial court declined to
grant it relief, despite the clerk of the court's acknowledgment on the record
that erred in rejecting the cost check and bid submitted on behalf of
TCBNA.428 The trial court found that, because 'TCBNA had prepared the
proposed form of the final judgment in the foreclosure case, which was
signed as submitted, and which provided that the Clerk's fee would be paid
in cash and in advance of the sale," TCBNA failed to comply under contract
law with the terms of the agreement.429
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held the trial court grossly abused
its discretion and reversed with an order requiring the clerk to accept
TCBNA's bid and cost payment and declaring it the successful bidder on the
in section 713.06(1) is almost identical to that of section 713.05 and the reasons stated in
Zalay are equally applicable to the lien at issue and the court adopts them. See Parsons, 751
So. 2d at 656. Further, under section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes fees may properly be
taxed after the entry of a final judgment in a foreclosure lien action. NCN Elec., Inc, v. Leto,
498 So. 2d 1377, 1377-78 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
420. 763 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
421. Id. at 1108.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Nathanson, 763 So. 2d at 1108.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id
429. Id.
[Vol. 25:115
Brown / Grohman
property in question.430 Prior to this, the clerk established that a "for cash"
requirement in Palm Beach County "is understood to be cash or check."43'
Further, this is stated in Palm Beach County Administrative Order 95-3-R
which provides that "[i]f you are an attorney and you (or your client) are the
successful bidder, you may pay your deposit and bid... and costs and fees
by a trust account check... or law firm account check.' '432 This order was
in effect at the time of the sale.433
Zerquera v. Centennial Homeowners' Ass'n.43' The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it entered a final judgment of foreclosure
as to Zerquera for the total amount owed, including attorneys' fees and costs
of $31,023.79 and ordered a foreclosure sale if Zerquera did not pay the
judgment within three days of the order.435
In 1989, Zerquera purchased Centennial property which was subject to
a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions"
("Declaration"). 436 The pertinent provisions were: "(1) assessments would
be a continuing lien on the property; (2) Centennial could foreclose on the
property if the continuing lien was not paid; and (3) Centennial could amend
the Declaration in the future. ' 437
"In 1991, Centennial amended the Declaration to provide that violators
of the Declaration's covenants could be fined and that said fines would be
treated as assessments .... ,,438 In 1995, Centennial fined Zerquera $200 for
keeping a boat and a truck on his property which violated the Declaration.
439
Zerquera challenged these fines and on appeal the court held that the
amendments to the Declaration were valid and enforceable." ° An award was
affirmed against Zerquera for $21,400 which included the fine, attorneys'
fees, and costs.4 1 On March 16, 1999, the trial court entered its final
judgment of foreclosure against Zerquera for $31,023.79 and ordered a
430. Nathanson, 763 So. 2d at 1109.
431. Id. at 118-09.
432. Id. at 1109.
433. Id.
434. 752 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
435. Id. at 695.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
440. Id.
441. Id.; see also Zerquera v. Centennial Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 751
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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foreclosure sale of his homestead property within three days if Zerquera did
not pay the judgment.442
The Third District Court of Appeal held that Zerquera's property may
be foreclosed upon to satisfy the $31,023.79 judgment. 443 A homestead
"may be foreclosed to satisfy a continuing lien on the property if the
homeowner had either actual or constructive notice of the covenant" that
provides for the lien when the owner took title to the property. 4" Here,
Zerquera had at least constructive notice of the Declaration when he took
title to the property in 1989. 45 Further, based on the Declaration, Zerquera
was on proper notice when this Declaration was later amended." 6 He was
aware that his homestead property was subject to foreclosure if fines were
not paid." 7
XI. HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS
Recent legislation prohibits homeowner associations from restricting
respectful displays of the United States flag.
4"
XII. HOMESTEAD
Bakst, Cloyd & Bakst, P.A. v. Cole.49 The issue was whether the trial
court correctly held that Cole's homestead property was not subject to her
attorney's charging lien.4 '4
Bakst represented Cole in her divorce.451  As a result of that
452
representation, Bakst obtained a charging lien. Bakst requested thatCole's homestead property be subject to attachment.4 53 The trial court
442. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
443. Id.
444. Id.; see also Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
445. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
446. Id. at 696.
447. Id.
448. Ch. 2000-302, § 47, 2000 Fla. Laws 3129, 3031 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 617.3075(3) (2000)).
449. 750 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
450. Id. at 676.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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determined that Cole's homestead property should not be subject to the
attorney's charging lien.454
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed that Cole's homestead
property was not subject to the charging lien.455 A waiver of the homestead
exemption was not enforceable on public policy grounds.4 56 The language in
the contract was insufficient to establish a knowing waiver of an important
.... 457
constitutional right such as homestead protection.
In re Coin. s The issue here was whether the Coins, debtors in
bankruptcy, were entitled to claim five contiguous lots and a house as part of
a homestead exemption when they took affirmative steps to have each lot
individually taxed and only claimed homestead exemption status on the lot
with the house situated on it.
459
The Coins purchased their house and lots five through nine on
December 20, 1985 in the same purchase transaction. 46 Their house was
located on lot seven, with lots five, six, eight, and nine being used as their
driveway and front lawn.4 61 All of the lots were contiguous and the Coins
never used lots five, six, eight, or nine other than for household purposes.462
In 1993, the Coins requested that Monroe County tax each lot separately and
only claimed homestead exemption on lot seven.46 3 On May 5, 1999, the
Coins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and scheduled lots five through nine as
exempt homestead under Article X, section 4(a)(1) of the Florida
Constitution.
The court held that the Coins qualified for homestead exemption on lots
five, six, eight, and nine and for their house on lot seven.465 It based its
decision on Article X, section 4(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution which
states in part:
454. Cole, 750 So. 2d at 676.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 676-77; see also Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956).
457. Cole, 750 So. 2d at 677.
458. 241 B.R. 258 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
459. Id. at 258-59.
460. Id. at 258.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Coin, 241 B.R. at 258.
464. Id. at 259.
465. Id. at 258.
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SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions -
(a) There shall be exempt... the following property owned by a
natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of
one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements
thereon... or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-
half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be
limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family.4
6
Further, the court held that the divisibility of the lots for zoning purposes and
tax purposes did not defeat the homestead claim.
467
Colwell v. Royal International Trading Corp.48 The issue here was
whether married individuals living on two distinct noncontiguous parcels of
property can be granted separate homestead exemptions, where their living
arrangements were not known to be the subject of fraud, and there was no
evidence brought forward to overcome the presumption in favor of the
exception. 46 9
The Colwells jointly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.47 0 Although legal
separations are not recognized under Florida law, the Colwells had been
separated for three and one half years, and each had acquired a separate
home and had obtained a separate homestead exemption on that home.47 2
Florida has chosen to opt out of federal exemptions and to apply its own.472
The bankruptcy court ruled there was no case law to support the dual
exemptions. The Colwells appealed to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida which reversed the bankruptcy court.474
The district court held that the Colwells were each entitled to separate
homestead exemptions when they were married but legitimately living apart
in separate residences and there was neither fraud nor evidence to overcome
the presumption in their favor.475 Florida state court decisions, as a matter of
466. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
467. Coin, 241 B.R. at 259; see also In re Dudeney, 159 B.R. 1003, 1004 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1993).
468. 196 F.3d 1225 (11 th Cir. 1999).
469. Id. at 1226.
470. Id. at 1225.
471. Id. at 1225-26.
472. Id. at 1226.
473. Colwell, 196 F.3d at 1226.
474. Id.
475. Id.
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public policy, liberally construe the state's homestead exemption.4 76
Additionally, there is a presumption in favor of the exemption.
477
In re Harrison.4 78 The issue here was whether Harrison could claim as
exempt a residence located on Marco Island on which she did not reside but
in which she still owned a half interest.479
Harrison and Christopher Lewis Hoef, Harrison's former spouse, were
married in 1982 and had two children.480 They established their residence on
Marco Island, and it remained their marital home until their divorce in
1997.48 Afterwards, Harrison continued to reside in the home until July
1998, when she moved to Naples and rented a home where she resided with
the younger child. 2 Harrison contended she was forced to move because
the elder son's drug related activities created a harmful environment for the
younger child.8 3 Harrison's former spouse and elder son still resided in the
Marco Island home. 4" Further, Harrison was to receive the first $7000 from
the sale of the home.8 5
The court held Harrison was entitled to claim interest in the Marco
Island property as her homestead. 6 The homestead exemption established
by Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution places the burden on the
objecting party to make a strong showing that Harrison was not entitled to
claim exemption.4 7 Further, abandonment may only be proven by a strong
showing that Harrison never intended to return to the residence and mere
absence for financial, health, or family reasons is not abandonment.48
Harrison still owned a half interest in the property and resided there after the
divorce.4 9 She left because of family reasons, which alone would not be
deemed abandonment.490
476. Id.
477. Id.; see also Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1997).
478. 236 B.R. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1999).
479. Id. at 789.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 789.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 790.
487. Id.; see In re Imprasert, 86 B.R. 721,722 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
488. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 790; see Monson v. First Nat'l Bank of Bradenton, 497
F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1974).
489. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 790.
490. Id.
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In re Hendricks.4 91 The issue here was whether Hendricks would be
allowed to claim homestead exemption in a bankruptcy suit where the
claimed exempt property was owned as tenancy by the entireties by both
Hendricks and the nondebtor spouse, and the claims from the creditors were
only against Hendricks. 49 Further, there was the issue of whether
Hendricks' converting nonexempt assets into an exempt home caused
Hendricks to lose her homestead exemption.
4 93
Prior to moving to Florida, Hendricks owned a residence in
California.494 A large judgment was issued against Hendricks on August 7,
1997 in favor of her creditors.4 95 Shortly afterwards, Hendricks sold her
California residence.4% In September 1997, Hendricks and her spouse
purchased a home in Melbourne, Florida. 97 Hendricks used her personal
funds to make a cash payment: 98 The home was jointly owned by Hendricks
and her spouse as tenancy by the entireties.499 There was no dispute that
Hendricks and her spouse owned the home as a tenancy by the entireties and
also that there were no joint creditors of the couple. °°
The bankruptcy court held that Hendricks was entitled to summary
judgment501 It reasoned Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution
does not provide that the right to exempt property is forfeited if property is
acquired or improved with the intent to hinder creditors where the property
qualified, as it did in this case, for homestead exemption.5m Further, the
bankruptcy court opined that section 222.29 of the Florida Statutes does not
apply to homestead property.5 3 Therefore, Hendricks established she was
entitled to exempt the home from creditors.
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill.5 4 The primary issue here was whether
the trial court properly denied Havoco's objection to a claimed homestead
exemption and tenancy by the entirety, on the ground that Hill converted
491. 237 B.R. 821 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
492. Id. at 823.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 822.
495. Id.
496. Hendricks, 237 B.R. at 822-23.
497. Id. at 823.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 824.
501. Hendricks, 237 B.R. at 826.
502. Id. at 825.
503. Id.
504. 197 F.3d 1135 (llthCir. 1999).
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nonexempt assets into exempt assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud Havoco. 5 Because of the property involved, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES ARTICLE X, SECTION 4 OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPT A FLORIDA HOMESTEAD
WHERE THE DEBTOR ACQUIRED THE HOMESTEAD
USING NON-EXEMPT FUNDS WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT
OF HINDERING, DELAYING, OR DEFRAUDING
CREDITORS IN VIOLATION OF FLA. STAT. § 726.105 OR
FLA. STAT. §§ 222.29 and 222.30? 506
The court held, however, that, in a case involving a tenancy by the
entireties where the wife's property rights may be terminated, her due
process rights require that she be a party to the proceeding.' °7 Therefore,
this court found that Hill's wife was an indispensable party to Havoco's
claim and Havoco's objection was denied.508 Havoco must seek to avoid this
transfer in an adversarial proceeding with both Hill and his wife as parties.5°
In the meantime, the court certified the aforementioned question to the
Supreme Court of Florida.510
Kellogg v. Schreiber.511 There were two issues here.512 The first was
procedurally oriented in determining whether the district court was correct
when it held that the bankruptcy judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying Kellogg's motion for continuance and rehearing.513 The court held
that missed deadlines for disclosing witnesses and evidence, and a last
minute attempt to terminate his counsel did not warrant a continuance and
affirmed.514 The second issue was whether the bankruptcy court was correct
when it ordered the sale of Kellogg's property, which exceeded the one-half
acre homestead limitation, because if Kellogg selected one-half acre to be
505. Id. at 1136-37.
506. Id. at 1144.
507. Id. at 1140.
508. Id.
509. Hill, 197 F.3d at 1140.
510. Id. at1144.
511. 197 F.3d 1116 (1lth Cir. 1999).
512. See id. at 1119-20.
513. Id. at 1120.
514. Id.
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exempt, the remaining nonexempt property would have no legal or practical
use because it would violate local zoning laws.515
In 1993, Schreiber obtained a judgment lien against Kellogg for
$512,863 and had been trying to collect it since then.5' In 1995, Kellogg
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition claiming a Florida homestead
exemption on his Palm Beach oceanfront property.517 "Kellogg stated his
homestead was approximately 1.3 'indivisible acres,"' and had a tax
assessor's value of $799,432.:5 8 Schreiber objected to the claim because it
exceeded Florida's exemption for municipal property, which is limited to
one-half acre.519 Kellogg's property was zoned R-AA.52°  "For R-AA
property, Palm Beach's zoning laws required a minimum parcel size of
60,000 square feet with at least 150 feet fronting a road ....,,521 Kellogg's
property could not be divided in a legal or practical manner to meet this
requirement.522 Therefore, the court ruled that Kellogg's property must be
sold and the proceeds apportioned between Kellogg and the bankruptcy
estate.52'
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Kellogg could not
select a one-half acre portion of his property to be exempt homestead when
the local zoning laws prohibited him from subdividing his property.
52
Therefore, the bankruptcy court correctly ordered the property sold and the
proceeds divided. 525 This was based on the fact that Florida's homestead
laws must be liberally construed, but not so liberally that they become
"'instruments of fraud, an imposition on creditors, or a means to escape
honest debts."' ' Further, Kellogg may reasonably designate his one-half
acre portion of the property as homestead as long as the remaining portion
515. Id.
516. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1118.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
520. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1118.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 1118-19.
523. Id. at 1119.
524. Id. at 1120.
525. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1121.
526. Id. at 1120 (citing Frase v. Branch, 362 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.
1978)).
[Vol. 25:115
Brown! Grohman
has legal and practical use.527 Here, the nonexempt parcel would have no
legal or practical use because it would violate local zoning laws.528
Law v. Law.5 29 The issue here was whether, when the husband and wife
separated and 'the husband moved from the home they had shared and
claimed as their homestead (his mother's home), the home became the
husband's homestead and therefore exempted the husband from any claim
for support payments to his former wife. 30
In May 1995, Law and his present wife, Barbara, separated and he
moved out of the home that the two of them owned in tenancy by the
entireties and into his mother's home. 31 He took his minor great grandson,
for whom he was the legal guardian, with him. 5 3 2 He received both his
grandson's and his mail at this home.533 Law's mother became ill in
February 1997 and Barbara moved into that home to help him care for his
mother.53 Law received power of attorney and contracted to sell his
mother's home. 35 His mother died in March 1997 and Law inherited her
home.536 The probate court entered an order on April 22 that the home had
passed to Law as his mother's only heir.537 The house was sold pursuant to
the contract on April 28.538
The court held the home that Law had inherited was his homestead and,
therefore, exempt from his ex-wife's judgment.5 39 The court stated that
homestead exemption can be extended to each of two people who are
married, but "legitimately" live apart in separate residences, if they meet the
other requirements of the exemption. s4 In this case there was evidence of a
legitimate separation between Law and Barbara in May 1995, and ample
evidence that Law was residing in his mother's home and that he intended to
527. Id. at 1120; see Englander v. Mills, 95 F.3d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir. 1996).
528. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1120.
529. 738 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
530. Id. at 523.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Law, 738 So. 2d at 523.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 523-24.
538. Id. at 524.
539. Law, 738 So. 2d at 524.
540. Id. at 525; see Isaacson v. Isaacson, 504 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
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reside there until it was sold.541 There was no reason that Law could not
have one homestead and that it be different than his wife's since their
separation was bona fide and since Law intended to reside in the home he
had inherited from his mother.5 2
In re Simms.5 3 The issue here was whether the Simms should be
allowed a claimed exemption in an annuity that was invested together with
the net proceeds from the sale of their former homestead or, in the
alternative, should they be denied their claim of homestead exemption on
their Okeechobee property.544
Prior to January 29, 1999, the Simms resided at 1802 Montague Lane,
Lake Worth, Florida and used the Okeechobee property for recreational
purposes.5 45 During the summer of 1998, they sold the Lake Worth prope r
and established the Okeechobee property as their permanent residence.
They sold their Lake Worth property on January 29, 1999.:17 Afteraying
off their mortgage, they received net sale proceeds of $65,467.57. The
Simms endorsed this check over to USG Annuity and Life Company in
exchange for the annuity.M9 Both worked for John H. Simnms, Inc., a
janitorial service, which Mr. Simms owned.550 In March 1999, Mrs. Simms'
health declined sharply and she was no longer able to work, causing the
company to lose some major accountsY.55  The Simms decided to file
bankruptcy and filed for Chapter 7 on August 7, 1999.552
The bankruptcy court held that the Simms were allowed both the
exemption for the annuity and also the homestead exemption on the
Okeechobee property. 3 The court based the exemption for the annuity on
the Simms' conversion of the nonexempt funds and net proceeds from the
sale of the Lake Worth property, which was not done to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors in violation of sections 726.105, 726.108, 222.29, and
541. Law, 738 So. 2d at 525.
542. Id.
543. 243 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000).
544. Id. at 157.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 157-58.
548. Simms, 243 B.R. at 158.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Simms, 243 B.R. at 160.
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222.30 of the Florida Statutes.' The Simms continued to pay their
creditors until March when Mrs. Simms became very ill.555 Therefore, the
facts did not suggest any intent on the part of the Simms to hinder, delay, or
defraud their creditors by purchasing the annuity.55 6 Further, the court noted
the Simms' decision to sell their Lake Worth property and transfer their
homestead to the Okeechobee property was made a year before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition.557 Again, there did not seem to be any intent to
defraud their creditors. The court acknowledged that Florida has very liberal
exemption laws, and that absent legislative intervention, these laws must be
applied with consistency.
558
Staten Island Savings Bank v. Morace.559 The issue here was whether
the trial court properly held the establishment of homestead could not be
defeated by statutory provisions for voiding a fraudulent transfer of
nonexempt assets converted into homestead property, even when the intent
of the debtor is to defeat creditors' claims.560
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct on the above
issues.561 The appellate court based its opinion on the fact that the Supreme
Court of Florida's prior statements that neither the legislature nor the
supreme court has the power to create an exception to the constitutionally
562provided homestead exemption.
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
3679 Waters Avenue Corp. v. Water Street Ovens, LtL 563 Here, the
tenant leased space for a restaurant in a shopping center, but never moved
in.5" Both the landlord and the tenant claimed the other had breached, but,
the trial court, finding the lease to be clear and unambiguous, held for the
tenant and awarded damages because the landlord had failed to make certain
improvements.565 The lease provided that the landlord was contemplating a
554, Id. at 159.
555. Id. at 160.
556. Id. at 159.
557. Id.
558. Simms, 243 B.R. at 160.
559. 745 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
560. Id. at 468.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. 25 Fla. L. Weekly D441 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 18,2000).
564. Id. at D441.
565. Id. at D441-42.
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major renovation of the shoppingcenter which might involve demolition of a
portion of the leased building.5  It required the landlord to make certain
improvements after demolition and to abate the rent at certain times during
construction, but it never specifically required the landlord to demolish
anything. 567  Since this involved only the interpretation of the lease
document, the district court was not obligated to defer to the trial court.
56
After reviewing the language of the entire lease, it concluded that the lease
was ambiguous as to whether the landlord was obligated to demolish
anything and that, inferentially, demolition was the condition precedent to
the landlord's obligation to make the improvements.5 69 Thus, the trial
court's judgment that the landlord had breached that obligation was incorrect
and the case was remanded so that parol evidence could be introduced to
help in interpreting the lease.57°
Baldwin Sod Farms, Inc. v. Corrigan.571 The commercial tenant filed
for bankruptcy but the bankruptcy court granted the landlords limited relief
from the automatic stay to the extent that they could proceed in rem to
recover possession of the realty.572 The landlords subsequently filed a two
count complaint in circuit court.573 The first count sought eviction and
requested the court retain jurisdiction to determine damages when the
bankruptcy court lifted the stay on that issue.574 The second count sought a
temporary injunction to prevent the removal of certain personal property.575
The trial court found for the landlords and ordered eviction.5 76 That decision
made the claim for injunctive relief moot.577
On appeal, the tenant challenged the circuit court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 78 In eviction and equity matters, the county courts and circuit
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, however, the circuit courts' jurisdiction
extends only to cases that satisfy the statutory amount in controversy of
566. Id. at D442.
567. Id.
568. 3679 Waters Ave. Corp., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D442.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. 746 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
572. Id. at 1200.
573. Id. at 1201.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202.
577. Id.
578. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 34.011(1) (2000).
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$15,000Y 9 The complaint must state the grounds on which the circuit
court's jurisdiction is based, but the landlord's complaint did not seek
damages because to do so would have violated the stay."8 However, the
landlord did ask that the court retain jurisdiction to determine damages.581
The three day notice letter, which was an exhibit to the complaint, and
therefore incorporated into the complaint by reference, demanded the past
due rent that was far in excess of the jurisdictional amount.58 2 According to
the district court, that was enough to give the circuit court jurisdiction.8 3
Moreover, the claim for equitable relief was sufficient to invoke the circuit
court's jurisdiction under the circumstances because the allegations in the
complaint were sufficient even though equitable relief was not granted.5 '
The tenant also challenged the trial court's denial of a jury trial.585 The
tenant made a timely demand for a jury trial and the district court held the
failure to remind the court of that demand did not constitute a waiver.586 But
the district court was faced with the question of whether the tenant had a
right to a jury trial.5 7 Neither chapter 51 nor chapter 83 of the Florida
Statutes expressly provided for a right to a jury trial in an eviction.5 88
Chapter 51 merely provides when to make a demand for a jury trial "[i]f a
jury trial is authorized by law" and chapter 83, governing nonresidential
tenancies, is silent in regards to the right to a jury trial.58 The question
turned on "whether the right was recognized at common law, at the time the
Florida Constitution was adopted."0 No Florida case provided an answer,
so the district court relied on a decision of the United States Supreme Court
which concluded that a jury trial was required because a modem eviction
action served the same function as a common law action of ejectment.591
In this case, the tenant had claimed that the three day notice was
improperly served, that it had not been given the notice of default required
by the lease, that rent payments had been tendered but rejected, and that the
579. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202; FLA. STAT. §§ 34.01(c), .011(1) (2000).
580. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202.
586. Id. at 1206.
587. Id. at 1203-06.
588. Id. at 1203; see tA. STAT §§ 51, 83 (2000).
589. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203; FLA. STAT. §§ 51.011(3), 83.21 (2000).
590. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203.
591. Id. at 1205 (citing Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 376 (1974)).
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tenant had made accountings as required.592 Therefore, issues of fact existed
for a jury to decide. 93  Consequently, the case had to be reversed and
remanded for a jury trial.594
Carney v. Gambe.595 The plaintiff was the head of security for a
country club community.596 The defendants lived in the community.597 The
adult son of the defendants lived in their home. 9 The plaintiff alleged that,
while performing his duties, he was physically attacked by the defendants'
adult son.599 His claim against the defendants was based on the theory that
the defendants owed him a duty of care, both as parents and as landlords, to
protect him from the son's reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct.60° The
trial court disagreed and dismissed the complaint?6' The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed because it could find no precedent or reason for
imposing a duty of care in the absence of a special relationship between the
parents and their son.6°2 The son was an emancipated adult even though he
was living with his parents. ' 3 Therefore, they had no power to control
him.0
4
Grant v. Thornton. 5 The landlord leased part of a duplex as a
residence. 6°6 The front door was secured with a double cylinder deadbolt
which required a key to unlock the door from either side.607 That type of
lock on exit doors of a residence was prohibited by the building code. A
fire started in the kitchen, but the tenant's keys were in the kitchen.6 9
Unable to escape through the locked front door, the tenant jumped through
the living room window and was seriously injured.610 The tenant filed suit
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 1206.
595. 751 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
596. Id. at 654.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Carney, 751 So. 2d at 654.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. 749 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
606. Id. at 531.
607. Id. at 530.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 530.
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against the landlord for personal injuries. 61' The landlord's motion for
summary judgment was granted because the tenant had never notified the
landlord that a dangerous condition existed and the landlord was unaware
that the locks violated the code.
612
The second district reversed.613 The landlord had a duty to make the
leased residence reasonably safe.614 State statute obligated the landlord to
maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable code.615 The
statute, in effect, created a statutory warranty of habitability, the violation of61
which might be considered evidence of negligence. 616 The landlord gave the
keys to the tenant, so it was clear that he knew about the locks.617 His claim
that he did not know the locks violated the building code was not a valid
61defense. '8 Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted
for the landlord.
619
Investment Builders of Florida, Inc. v. S. U.S. Food Market Investments,
Inc.62° The president of the tenant corporation was sick and failed to send
the notice needed to renew the lease.62' When his omission was called to his
attention eight days after the renewal deadline had passed, he immediately
sent the renewal notice.622 The landlord refused to renew the lease, so the
tenant brought this action for declaratory judgment.623 Equity can provide
relief from the consequences of a mistake, such as failing to give timely
notice of renewal, when "(1) the tenant's delay is slight, (2) the delay did not
prejudice the landlord, and (3) failure to grant relief would cause the tenant
unconscionable hardship. ' '62 The trial court held that the tenant had625
satisfied the test and the district court affined.
611. Id.
612. Id. at 532.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 531; see FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (2000).
616. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 531-32.
617. ld. at 532.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. 753 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
621. Id. at 759.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 760.
625. Inv. Builders of Fla., Inc., 753 So. 2d at 760.
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LPI/Key West Associates, Ltd. v. Sarah Luna, Inc.626 Plaintiff was a
tenant under a commercial lease which expressly provided that it would be
the only tenant "whose main business purpose is the sale or distribution of
bagels, or whose business otherwise functions as a 'bagel bakery. "627
Pursuant to that clause, the tenant unsuccessfully sought an injunction to
prevent the landlord from leasing space to a Dunkin' Donuts franchise. 628
The district court reasoned that the plain language of the lease was
controlling. 629 The testimony showed that Dunkin' Donuts would serve
bagels, but its main business was the sale of donuts and Dunkin' Donuts
would not be a "bagel bakery" because baking and selling bagels was not its
primary function. Consequently, leasing to Dunkin' Donuts would not
breach the plaintiff's lease.
Magnolia Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Magnolia Village, Inc. 631 The
owners of mobile homes who leased spaces in a mobile home park
632
challenged the landlord's rent increase. The judge certified the tenant
class but limited its membership to current tenants who were there when the
633
rent was increased. The district court held that the class should be
expanded to include assignees of leases from tenants who would have
qualified as class members but for their having assigned their leases, so long
as the assignees had paid the increased rent. The court relied on statutory
language that, "[tihe purchaser of a mobile home who becomes a resident of
the mobile home park in accordance with this section has the right to assume
the remainder of the term of any rental agreement then in effect.
'6 35
Consequently, a lease assignee succeeds to the original tenant's right to
challenge the propriety of the rent amount.
636
Mangum v. Susser.637 The landlord sued the commercial tenant for
possession and back rent.638 The tenant vacated the property and defended
626. 749 So. 2d 564 (Ha. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
627. Id. at 565.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. 758 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
632. Id. at 1202. Such leases are regulated by chapter 723 of the Florida Statutes,
entitled "Mobile Home Park Tenancies." See FLA. STAT. § 723 (2000).
633. Magnolia Viii. Homeowners Ass'n, 758 So. 2d at 1202.
634. Id.
635. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 723.059 (1997)).
636. Magnolia Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 758 So. 2d at 1202.
637. 764 So. 2d 653 (Ha. 1st Dist. Ct. 2000).
638. Id. at 654.
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the suit on the theory that the notice to vacate was defective."' The trial
court granted summary judgment for the tenant, but the district court
reversed."'4 The tenant had failed to follow the rules of civil procedure
requiring affirmative defenses to be raised in the answer and that failure of a
condition precedent, such as filing a notice to vacate, must be pled
specifically."1 Therefore, the tenant had waived its affirmative defenses by
failing to raise them properly." 2 Moreover, the claim for possession had
become moot when the tenant vacated, leaving only the claim for damages
for overdue rent.643 A notice to vacate is not needed before the landlord can
recover rent that is owed.644 The tenant had also claimed that the successor
landlord could not be the assignee of a claim for rent without a writing, but
the court could find no authority for the assertion that a rent claim could only
be assigned by a writing.64 5
Munao v. Homeowners Ass'n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park
Inc."64 The owners of mobile homes who rented space in a mobile home
park challenged the rent as being unconscionable under section 723.033 of
the Florida Statutes because the landlord had reduced the amenities." 7
Subsequent to the 1990 amendment of the statute, which lowered the
standard of the prohibition from "unconscionable" rent to "unreasonable"
rent, the trial court allowed the tenants to amend their complaint to charge
the rent was unreasonable." s  Then the trial court found that the
unreasonable condition of the park necessitated a reduction in rent.649 On
appeal the landlord challenged the application of the 1990 standard, inter
alia, as an unconstitutional impairment of an existing contract.650 The
district court rejected that challenge because the state had the reserved power
to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship.651
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Mangum, 764 So. 2d at 655.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. 740 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
647. Id. at 75.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 76.
651. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 76.
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The landlord also challenged the finding that the rent was unreasonable
652
when it did not exceed what comparable parks charge. The district court
found that the statute allowed the court to consider other factors, such as the
condition of the amenities, in determining whether the rent was
unreasonable. Moreover, the court found that section 723.033 of the
Florida Statutes still had sufficient standards to survive a vagueness
challenge.
614
Ocwen Federal Bank v. LVWD, Ltd.655 The lease provided that the
tenant would pay "additional rent" which was defined as a pro-rata share of
operating expenses.656 The lease divided operating expenses into twelve
categories and limited to four percent the amount that certain expenses could
657be increased. The landlord had calculated the additional rent on a line by
line, category by category basis for the first three years of the lease.658 The
landlord then billed the tenant on an aggregate basis that produced a
substantial rent increase.559 The tenant objected and filed this suit for
declaratory judgment and damages. 660
The landlord demanded arbitration and the trial court agreed, although
it characterized the arbitration clause as yUZZY.,,661 On review, the district
court noted that this was a question of contract interpretation, so the review
662 663would be de novo.662 It then reversed. The arbitration clause expressly
restricted the arbitrator to specific issues, such as whether a particular item
was improperly included in the calculation of additional rent.664 While
doubts about whether the parties had agreed to submit a particular issue to
arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration, arbitration should not
be ordered where there is no doubt.665 The district court found no room for
doubt.666 This complaint challenged the method by which the additional rent
652. Id. at 76.
653. Id. at 77.
654. Id.
655. 766 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
656. Id. at 248.
657. Id. at 249.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 766 So. 2d at 249.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 766 So. 2d at 249.
666. Id.
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was calculated, not whether a particular item was properly included. 667
Clearly, it was not within the scope of the arbitration clause.6
Park Avenue BBQ & Grille of Wellington, Inc. v. Coaches Corner,
Inc.69 Coaches Comer operated a sports bar in a shopping center.6 70 Under
the terms of its lease, the landlord was prohibited from leasing space to a
restaurant or bar that devoted "'more than ten percent of its space to use as a
sports bar/sports restaurant or for the viewing of sporting events."' 671 The
new landlord subsequently sold the property.672 Later, Coaches Comer
learned that the landlord intended to lease space to a restaurant that would
have televisions showing sports events, so Coaches Corner's attorney sent a
letter to the successor landlord reminding it of the restriction. 673  The
president of Park Avenue was made aware of the restriction and got the
successor landlord to agree to a term in its lease allowing it to televise
sports.674 Coaches Comer brought this action for an injunction against both
Park Avenue and the landlord.67
The first defense raised was laches.676 However, Coaches Corner had
brought this action less than one month after Park Avenue had signed its
lease and before it had opened for business.677 Since the plaintiff had acted
promptly, laches was not a viable defense.
678
Park Avenue next raised lack of privity as a defense.679 Its point was
that it had not undertaken an obligation to Coaches Comer to refrain from
showing sports; its only contractual duties were to the landlord under the
terms of its lease.mo This argument also failed.61 The evidence showed that
Park Avenue took with notice of the restriction, that Coaches Comer would
suffer irreparable injury from the violation of the restriction, and that
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. 746 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
670. Id at 481.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 482.
673. Id. at 481-82.
674. ParkAve. BBQ & Grille, 746 So. 2d at 482.
675. Id. at481.
676. Id.
677. Id. at 482.
678. Id. at481.
679. Park Ave. BBQ & Grille, 746 So. 2d at 482.
680. Id.
681. Id.
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682Coaches had no adequate remedy at law. In essence, Coaches Comer had
demonstrated the essentials for equitable relief based on the logic that the
restriction burdened the land with an equitable servitude.683
Springbrook Commons, Ltd v. Brown.(84 The landlord brought this
eviction action based on the tenant's alleged failure to pay rent." 5 Having
failed twice to personally serve the tenant, the landlord effected service by
686posting the complaint on the front door of the leased premises. The tenant
failed to respond to the complaint and the court awarded the landlord
judgment for possession. 687 The landlord, however, also wanted the court to
award costs, but the court refused.688
The landlord argued that it was entitled to costs under section 85.59(4)
of the Florida Statutes.69 However, the court reasoned that service b
posting did not confer personal jurisdiction on the court under the statute.
The district court affirmed, reasoning, "[i]f this tenant had been personally
served, the landlord would be entitled to costs under the statute, but in the
absence of personal service, a costs judgment would violate due process., 691
XIV. LIENS
Betaco, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 69  The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it decided that an "execution sale" which
occurs beyond the twenty year period from the recording of a judgment lien
was ineffective because the judgment lien had expired before the execution
sale occurred.
6 93
Betaco's predecessor-in-interest recorded a judgment against the owner
694
of the property on March 10, 1977. In May 1979, a writ of execution was
682. Id.
683. id. at 482.
684. 761 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
685. Id. at 1193.
686. Id. Service by posting was allowed under section 48.183 of the Florida Statutes.
FLA. STAT. § 48.183 (2000).
687. Brown, 761 So. 2d at 1193.
688. Id.
689. See id. at 1194; see also FLA. STAT. § 89.59(4) (2000).
690. Brown, 761 So. 2d at 1193.
691. Id. at 1194.
692. 752 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
693. Id. at 697.
694. Id.
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issued .695 Then, in 1993, the property owner mortgaged the property to
Countrywide, who was the mortgage holder at the time of the default.6% On
January 27, 1997, Betaco delivered instructions to the sheriff, who levied the
property on February 18. 697 This was recorded several days later.69 & The
sheriff's sale was held on April 17, 1997.99 Betaco's predecessor-in-interest
took title through sheriff's deed at that time, and Betaco subsequently took
title to the property by warranty deed.7"0
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in deciding that
the judgment lien on the property had expired before the execution sale,
stating that the deed held by Betaco's predecessor-in-interest was legally
null because the lien had expired before the sheriff held the execution sale.701
"An execution is valid and effective only during the life of the judgment on
which it is issued."702 Further, the court referred to section 55.091 of the
Florida Statutes, which provided that "'no judgment.., shall be a lien upon
real... property within the state after the expiration of 20 years from the
date of the entry of such judgment."' 7 3 Therefore, since the life of the
judgment expired on March 10, 1997, and the execution sale was not
completed before that date, the lien was no longer valid when the execution
sale took place.
CDS & Associates of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. 1711 Donna Road
Associates, Inc.70 5 The issue here was whether the trial court proper held
that a construction lien cannot be based on a contract implied in law.
The appellate court noted that "[t]he trial court found as a factual matter
that no contract was created in this case by the parties' words or conduct,
and that CDS was limited to quasi contractual remedies., 707 Therefore, CDS
was not able to "enforce its quantum meruit recovery through the imposition
of a mechanics' lien."7 8 First, section 713.05 of the Florida Statutes states:
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697.
698. Id.
699. Id.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697; see FLA. STAT. § 56.021 (2000).
703. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.091 (1977)).
704. Id.
705. 743 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
706. Id. at 1224.
707. Id. at 1225.
708. Id.
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[A] contractor who complies with the provisions of this part shall,
subject to the limitations thereof, have a lien on the real property
improved for any money that is owed to him or her for labor,
services, materials, or other items required by, or furnished in
accordance with, the direct contract.
70
Second, section 713.01(5) defines a contract as "an agreement for improving
real property, written or unwritten, express or implied, and includes extras or
change orders.7 ° Therefore, a contract under the mechanics' lien law
requires an agreement.711  No agreement, either express or implied, was
found to exist in this case.71 2 In regards to the quasi contractual claim, the
court defined such contract as "a contract implied in law.... . 713 Further, a
quasi contract does not require an agreement, as does the mechanics' lien
statute.1 4 Therefore, a quasi contract is not a contract for purposes of the
mechanics' lien statute.715
Diaz v. Plumhoff.7 16 The issue here was whether the trial court properly
"declared Plumhoff to be the owner of real property previously owned by
Diaz, but deeded to Plumhoff by sheriff's sale under section 56.061, Florida
Statutes."
717
718This was a case of first impression. Plumhoff obtained a money
judgment against Diaz for a total of $8774.719 The money judgment "did not
constitute a lien on the property of Diaz because no certified copy containing
the address of Plumhoff was ever recorded." 720 However, Plumhoff
proceeded directly under section 56.061 of the Florida Statutes, which
states, "[l]ands and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of redemption in
real and personal property, and stock in corporations, shall be subject to levy
and sale under execution. '' 721 The trial court held that Plumhoff was not
required to proceed under section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes because
709. FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (2000).
710. § 713.01(5).
711. CDS & Assocs. of the Palm Beaches, Inc., 743 So. 2d at 1224.
712. Id. at 1225.
713. Id. at 1224.
714. Id. at 1224-25.
715. Id. at 1225.
716. 742 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
717. Id. at 846.
718. Id.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 846-47.
721. Diaz, 742 So. 2d at 847; see also FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (2000).
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perfecting the lien was not necessary for the sheriff to proceed under section
56.061 of the Florida Statutes.722
The appellate court held that it was necessary for Plumhoff to comply
with the requirements of section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes before
proceeding under section 56 .0 6 1 .r Further, the appellate court stated that
chapter 55 deals with the subject of judgments, and chapter 56 with final
process.72 The requirements of chapter 55 must be met before moving to
chapter 56.72 7
Gulfside Properties Corp. v. Chapman Corp. The issue here was
whether the trial court properly held that "Gulfside could not assert lack of
proper notice to [the] owner as a defense to Chapman's suit to enforce a
construction lien against Gulfside's property" where Gulfside failed to sign
the notice of commencement as owner, as required by section 713.13(1)(g)
of the Florida Statutes.
727
Gulfside, the owner of a real estate development, entered into an
agreement with Willis Construction, Inc. ('Willis") for the completion of
phase seven of a beach villas project.72 Ronnie Willis signed his own name
on the line indicated for the owner's signature on the notice of
commencement. 7 9 This notice was filed and recorded in Walton County.73°
Willis and Chapman entered into a contract to provide materials and labor73173
for the project. Gulfside paid Willis in full.732  Willis did not pay
Chapman in full. Chapman filed a lien against Gulfside.73
The appellate court held that Chapman failed to comply with
construction lien law by failing to serve a notice to the owner and that
Gulfside could assert this as a complete defense. 735 Further, the court held
that serving a notice to an owner would be a separate requirement under
construction lien law and must be followed, even if there is another problem
722. Diaz, 742 So. 2d at 847.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. 737 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
727. Id. at 605.
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Gulfside Props. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 605.
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 606.
735. Id. at 607.
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created by the other party.736 In this case, Gulfside was required to sign the
notice of commencement as owner.7 37 Because it failed to sign as owner, the
notice of commencement was not valid.738 The appellate court further noted
that a notice to owner must be served as a prerequisite for recording of a
lien, regardless of other violations, for the lien to be valid. 3  If it is not, this
failure can be used as a complete defense by the other party.740
Klein Development v. Ellis K. Phelps & Co.741 The issue here was
whether a fax copy of a release of lien would be binding and would prevent
the releasing party from later filing for foreclosure on that lien.742
In this case, the developer, Klein, stopped payment on its check to the
general contractor.743 The general contractor's check to the subcontractor,
Phelps, bounced when he tried to cash it.7 " The subcontractor then filed for
foreclosure on the lien.745 Klein tried to rely on the signed fax copy of a
release of lien.7"
The appellate court, after review of discovery, determined that the
subcontractor never intended to give up its right to foreclose on the lien until
the check it received had cleared.747 Therefore, it affirmed the lower court's
decision in favor of the subcontractor.
74
Lachance v. Desperado's of Holly Hill, Inc.749 The issue here was
which interest should have priority when there is a lien against a liquor
license. ° In this case there was an assignment of a lease to a third party,
with a provision requiring the license to be reconveyed to the assignor in the
event of a default or at the end of the lease.5
736. Gulfside Props. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 607.
737. Id.
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (2000); see also Torres v. Maclntyre, 334 So.
2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
741. 761 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
742. Id. at 442.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Klein Dev., 761 So. 2d at 442.
747. Id. at 443.
748. Id.
749. 760 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
750. Id. at 1023.
751. Id.
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The trial court found that the assignor had priority interest over an
investor who made a loan to the third party with the license as collateral. 52
The court said that having the agreement on file with the Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Division and "available for any person to
examine or inspect" was enough to establish priority, especially where the
original lessor held an ownership interest and not a lien interest in the
license and, therefore, had priority over the investor's lien.753
The appellate court agreed with the outcome of the case but for
different reasons.7M The court found that the lessor should prevail because
of the rule which allows for security interests in such licenses to exist and to
be enough to put potential investors on notice that they should make an
inquiry with the Department. 755 The appellate court recommended in its
decision that the legislature expand section 561.65 of the Florida Statutes so
that persons having an interest in such a license other than security may
record it with the division to provide notice to subsequent investors.756
Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc. v. United Companies Lending Corp.757
The issue here was whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the mortgagee, United, and against a lienor, Sasso,
under a claim of lien, determining that while the notice of commencement
was recorded prior to the mortgage, the notice did not comply with the
mechanics' lien statute requiring the signature of all owners of the
property.
758
Kevin and Sita Martin, as tenants by the entireties, executed a mortgage
with United.759 This mortgage was recorded on February 21, 1996.76° Sita
Martin had previously signed and recorded a notice of commencement on
January 3, 1996.761 The notice listed Sita Martin as the owner of the
property and Plumb, Level & Square, Inc. ("PLS") as the contractor.762
Kevin Martin owned PLS.763 The notice also provided that the owner
752. Id. at 1025.
753. Id.
754. Lachance, 760 So. 2d at 1025-27.
755. Id. at 1026.
756. Id. at 1027.
757. 742 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
758. Id. at 469.
759. Id.
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 469.
763. Id.
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appoint Kevin Martin to "receive notices required under the mechanics lien
law and designated him to receive lienor's notices.
During September of 1996, Kevin Martin contracted with Sasso to
replace his home's central air conditioning. 76s The contract listed PLS as the
"job name" and stated the work was to be done on "Kevin's own house."76
Kevin Martin signed the contract in his name and listed his residential
768address. 767 Sasso filed a claim of lien after the Martins failed to pay.
Eventually, the Martins stopped paying their mortgage and United
foreclosed, listing Sasso as a junior lienor, because its claim of lien was filed
after United recorded its mortgage.71
9
The appellate court held Sasso had priority due to the notice of
commencement being filed by Sita Martin before United filed its
mortgage.770  The court based this on the fact that United could have
performed a title search and "[u]pon finding the earlier filed notice of
commencement, United could have required the Martins to file a notice of
termination pursuant to section 713.132 prior to United recording the
mortgage., 77r Further, the appellate court noted that Sasso had "a notice of
commencement which appeared regular and complete in all respects," and if
the notice of commencement provided the lienor with necessary information
enabling it to serve notice to owner, the lienor should be able to rely on this
information.772 "The law does not require every contractor to conduct a title
search to verify that the information contained in the notice is true and
correct."" 3
XV. PARTITION
Biondo v. Powers."4  The issue here was whether the trial court
properly held that upon the partition and sale of jointly owned property,
764. Id.
765. Id.
766. Id.
767. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 469.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id. at 471.
771. Id.
772. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 471; see FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1)(a)
(2000).
773. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 471.
774. 743 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
[Vol. 25:115
Brown! Grohman
where a co-tenant made excess payments towards obligations of the
property, it would be proper to increase her equity in the property." 5
While Biondo and Powers were dating, they purchased real property in
Palm Beach for approximately $650,000.76 They obtained a purchase
money mortgage from the seller for $350,000.' n Both parties paid the
balance due at closing equally." 8 However, the deed named only Biondo as
the grantee.n 9 At closing Biondo executed a handwritten note, also signed
by Powers, saying he had received half of the closing money from Powers
and that all monies received from the sale of the property would be divided
equally, prorated as to invested amounts paid at closing.7 8 Subsequently,
Powers paid off the mortgage. 781 On the same day this occurred, Biondo
executed a quitclaim deed of the property to both Powers and himself as
joint tenants with right of survivorship, which was later recorded. 712 Also, it
was not disputed that the expenses paid by Powers exceeded those paid by
Biondo.78 3 Biondo issued a note to Powers for $350,000 payable in five
years with six and one-half percent interest and a mortgage on Biondo's
interest in the property to secure the note.7
In July 1997, Powers brought suit against Biondo to foreclose on the
note and mortgage, and to partition the property.7 5  The trial court
concluded that Powers' investment in the property totaled $760,000, figuring
that Biondo's investment was only his initial investment at closing of
approximately $134,000.86 The trial court then ordered a distribution of the
sale proceeds in proportion to the parties' respective investments-eighty-
five percent to Powers and fifteen percent to Biondo.
7s7
The appellate court held that the sale proceeds should have been
divided equally between Powers and Biondo because each had an equal
interest in the property.78  Biondo was required to reimburse Powers for his
775. Id. at 162.
776. Id.
777. Id.
778. Id.
779. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 162.
780. Id.
781. Id.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 163.
784. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 163.
785. Id.
786. Id.
787. Id. at 164.
788. Id.
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789proportionate share of the expenses for the property. It based this on
section 64.071(1) of the Florida Statutes, which states that the proceeds
from such a sale shall be divided among the parties in proportion to their
interests.79° Further, upon partition, a co-tenant is entitled to a credit from
proceeds of the sale for the other co-tenant's proportionate share of
expenses. 9
XVI. QUIET TITLE
Hardemon v. United Companies Lending Corp.792 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly entered a final judgment quieting title in
favor of United.
793
Hardemon and Jacquelyn Harris, his girlfriend, bought a home in 1992
as tenants in common. Hardemon was incarcerated in 1994 as a result of a
violent domestic dispute with Harris and was subsequently charged with
attempted kidnapping and aggravated battery. 95 Hardemon proposed to
Harris that she drop the charges and pursue no further action.79 In
exchange, he would execute a quitclaim deed to the property.797 Harris
agreed. 98 On the day he was released from jail, Hardemon conveyed to
Harris a notarized quitclaim deed of his one-half interest in the property.79
All charges against Hardemon were dropped.8°° Harris recorded the deed in
April 1994.80' Nearly three months after the recording of the deed, United
extended a first mortgage loan to Harris.802
United performed a title search revealing that Harris was the sole and
exclusive record owner at that time.80 3  Next, United recorded the
789. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 164.
790. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 64.071(1) (2000).
791. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 164; see Whitely v. Whitely, 329 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
792. 746 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
793. Id. at 1231.
794. Id.
795. Id.
796. Id.
797. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
803. Id.
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mortgage.8" In June 1994, almost a month after the mortgage was recorded,
Hardemon filed a suit against Harris and obtained a default judgment against
her setting aside the quitclaim deed.805 Hardemon claimed his signature was
forged.806 Harris never contested the action.807
United initiated the current action seeking to quiet title. 808 The
appellate court held that the trial court was correct when it entered a final
judgment quieting title in favor of United.W9 The evidence showed "United
was a bona fide purchaser without notice of any alleged irregularities in the
public record chain of title, and it is protected from claims outside that chain
of title.
'810
XVII. REAL ESTATE BROKERS
The Florida legislature continues to tinker with the chapter that
regulates real estate brokers. Chapter 2000-198 of the Laws of Florida
clarifies that it is not an appraisal when a real estate broker or salesperson
gives an opinion regarding the proper price for certain real estate or gives a
comparative price analysis.811 It also provides a modification to the escape
procedures that protect a real estate broker holding funds in escrow when a
dispute arises over those funds.812  Ordinarily, to be protected from an
administrative complaint by the escape procedures, the licensee must get an
escrow disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission, or
have the matter submitted to litigation, arbitration, or mediation, or get the
parties to agree to disbursement.8 13  However, the protection has been
expanded to include returning the escrow deposit of the buyer of a new
residential condominium who exercises his or her right to statutorily cancel
the purchase under section 718.503 of the Florida Statutes.
814
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id.
807. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
808. Id.
809. Id. at 1232.
810. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1)(2000); see also Koschler v. Dean, 642 So. 2d
1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
811. Ch. 2000-198, § 3, 2000 Fla. Laws 2026, 2034 (codified at FIA. STAT. § 475.612
(2000)).
812. Id. § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws. at 2026-27 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d)
(2000)).
813. FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (2000).
814. Ch. 2000-198, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2026, 2027 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 475.25(I)(d) (2000)).
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This year's act also changes the disclosure requirements for a licensee
who does not have a brokerage relationship with the potential buyer or
seller.815 The licensee must reveal that lack of relationship in writing before
showing the property.816 The disclosure may be incorporated into other
documents, but then it must be conspicuous.8 17 A number of exceptions to
the disclosure requirements have been added. For example, the disclosure
requirements do not apply: 1) when the licensee knows that the potential
buyer or seller already is represented by a broker or under circumstances
when the potential buyer should know from the setting that the licensee
represents only the seller, such as the project's sales office; 2) to non-
residential transactions; 3) in an "open house" or the showing of a model
home that does not involve obtaining confidential information, executing an
offer, and the like; and 4) to unanticipated casual conversations.818
Cabrerizo v. Fortune International Realty.8'9 The brokerage contract
allowed the seller to cancel by giving notice and paying a cancellation fee. 820
The seller gave the cancellation notice on May 16 as the contract allowed
and on May 29 delivered the cancellation fee to the broker.821 On May 20,
the seller entered into a sales contract with the buyers.8 The contract
showed a sales price of $140,000.823 Later the seller sued the buyers alleging
that the sales price was actually $700,000 because part of the price was a
check for $560,000.82 To the seller's consternation, the $560,000 check had
been rejected by the bank.825 In that suit, the seller testified that he first
heard the buyers were interested on May 14 and met with them on May
15.826
When the broker learned about the contract and breach of contract suit,
it filed suit for the brokerage commission.8Z7 Based upon the seller's
testimony in the breach of contract suit, the court granted summary judgment
for the broker and awarded the commission based on the sale price of
815. Id. § 2,2000 Fla. Laws at 2032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.278(4)(b) (2000)).
816. Id.
817. Id.
818. Id. at 2033 (codified at RA. STAT. § 475.278(5)(b)1, 2 (2000)).
819. 760 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
820. Id. at 229.
821. Id.
822. Id.
823. Id.
824. Cabrerizo, 760 So. 2d at 229.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id.
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$700,000.828 The seller appealed claiming his affidavits in the current case
contradicted his testimony in the breach of contract suit, so there was a
genuine issue of fact as to when the sales contract was entered into and the
amount of the sale price.829 The district court disagreed.830 It found that the
seller's conduct, attempting to contradict his own sworn testimony, was
inherently wrongful and he should not be allowed to benefit from it.
831
Harris v. Schickedanz Bros.-Riviera Ltd. 2  Harris apparently was
licensed as a salesman but not as a broker.8 33 He signed a contract with a de-
veloper under which he was to attempt to procure buyers for the developer's
residential units (thereby earning a commission), market the development,
and, if he kept expenses below a certain percentage of gross sales, earn a
bonus. 834 The developer terminated the contract and Harris sued.
835
The first count of the complaint was dismissed because it sought a
brokerage commission and Harris was not a broker.836 That ruling seemed
unassailable, so Harris did not appeal that ruling.837 But Harris appealed the
dismissal of the other counts.838 Count three was based on "quantum meruit
for the marketing services rendered under the original [written] contract. 8 39
However, quantum meruit is available only when there is no express
contract.m So this count was properly dismissed and the district court
aff'rmed.? 1 Counts two and four sought compensation for marketing the
development and the bonus for keeping marketing expenses low in relation
to sales . 2 This was an action for breach of contract.! 3 Since the services
828. Id.
829. Cabrerizo, 760 So. 2d at 229.
830. Id. at 230.
831. Id.
832. 746 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
833. See id. at 1153-54.
834. Id. at 1153.
835. Id.
836. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.41 (2000).
837. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1153.
838. Id. Count five involved the claim by another plaintiff, ReMac, for the recovery of
sums advanced to the developer who had agreed to repay. Id. at 1155. The trial court
incorrectly held that this claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds provisions found in section
671.206 of the Florida Statutes, which applies only to the sale of goods, and section 687.0304
of the Florida Statutes, which applies only to credit agreements. Id. at 1155-56.
839. Id. at 1155.
840. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155.
841. Id. at 1156.
842. Id. at 1153, 1155.
843. Id.
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provided were not the direct procurement of customers, they were not
brokerage services under the statutory definition, 8" and, therefore, this
recovery was not prohibited by the brokerage act.85 The developer had,
however, successfully raised a Statute of Frauds defense in the trial court.'
The claim was based on an unwritten reaffirmation of a written contract that
had been terminated.8 7 The district court rejected the defense because the
services had already been performed, taking the contract out of the Statute of
Frauds.8 On these counts, the district court reversed.849
XVII. REFORMATION
Florida Masters Packing, Inc. v. Craig.850  The common grantors
acquired the land, identified as the "parent tract."85'  Out of that, they
conveyed the "outparcel" to Wright.852 Unfortunately, the legal description
853in the deed was inaccurate. When Wright subsequently conveyed the
outparcel to Haffield, the same erroneous description was used.85 Haffield
lost the property through foreclosure.855 Throughout the foreclosure, the
same erroneous description was used.856 The plaintiff was the buyer at the
foreclosure sale.857 By the time the error was discovered, the common
grantor had sold the parent tract to the defendants using a deed that
described the land as the parent tract minus the outparcel according to the
same erroneous description.8
The plaintiff sued to reform its deed and to quiet its title.859 At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed the case with
prejudice and the plaintiff appealed.86 The district court focused upon
844. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.01(1)(c), (d) (2000).
845. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155; see FIA. STAT. § 475.41 (2000).
846. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155; see FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (2000).
847. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1154.
848. Id. at 1155.
849. Id. at 1156.
850. 739 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
851. ld. at 1289.
852. Id.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1289-90.
856. Id. at 1290.
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id.
860. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1290.
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reformation. 61 Since it is an equitable remedy, it would not be available
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice." 2 Here,
the defendants did not have actual notice because no information revealing
the problem had been communicated to themY.863 The defendants did not
have constructive notice because there was nothing in the record that might
reveal the problem.8 According to the record, the common grantor could
convey the title to the defendants that the deed purported to convey.865 Nor
did the defendants have implied actual notice, i.e., actual notice of facts that
would have led a prudent person to inquire and, consequently, discover the
problem. 6 Thus, defendants having paid for the land and taken without
notice were bona fide purchasers and the plaintiff's reformation action
should have failed.867
The court did not, however, explain why the defendants were not on
inquiry notice. 8 They did not have a survey done or even have the old one
checked.8 69 The defendants did not even go to the land to check the
boundaries.870 Monuments had been placed there by the surveyor and a
minimal inspection might have raised doubts about the boundaries.8 71 The
defendants never took any steps to check the physical boundaries. 872 Their
inaction would seem to be at odds with what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the circumstances. Consequently, it seems that the burden
should have shifted to the defendants to show that they were not negligent
and, even if they were, that the problem would not have been discovered by
their exercise of due diligence.87
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Id.
864. Id. at 1291.
865. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1291.
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Id.
870. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1291.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. Id.
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XIX. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
New legislation modifies the rule against perpetuities as it relates to
trusts. The former ninety-year provision is modified to 360 years, thereby
extending the permissible life of a trust."
XX. SALES
Attanasio v. Excel Development Corp.' Land buyers sued the
developer based on a number of alleged misrepresentations. 76 These
included misrepresentations that: 1) each lot on the canal would have an
easement across the land at the rear; 2) each lot would have the use of the
canal; 3) the wooded area at the back of each lot would be a natural buffer;
and 4) the maintenance fees paid to the association would cover the costs of
water usage in the underground sprinkler system.877 The defendant pointed
out that the sales contract contained an integration clause providing that the
writing constituted the entire agreement. 878 Then, it raised the defense that
the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds.8" The trial court
agreed, but the district court reversed.880
The Statute of Frauds requires any contract for the sale of any interest
in land to be in writing."' This case did not involve the breach of a promise
to do something in the future, and it did not involve the transfer of an interest
in land.882 The allegation here was that the defendant misrepresented a state
88v3 etd tt
of existing facts as an inducement to enter into a contract. Thus, the trial
court should not have held the Statute of Frauds was a bar to the recovery of
damages 4 .8
Engle Homes, Inc. v. Krasna.885 The buyers signed a contract to have a
custom home built in 1994.8 A year later, they closed on the contract,
874. Ch. 2000-245, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2392, 2392 (codified at FIA. STAT.
§ 689.255(2)(f), (7) (2000)).
875. 757 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
876. Id. at 1253.
877. Id. at 1253-54.
878. Id. at 1254.
879. Id.
880. Attanasio, 757 So. 2d at 1255.
881. Id. at 1254; FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (2000).
882. Ananasio, 757 So. 2d at 1254.
883. Id. at 1254-55.
884. Id. at 1256.
885. 766 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
886. Id. at 312.
[Vol. 25:115
Brown / Grohman
accepted title, and moved in.887 Almost two years later, they learned that
they might have a statutory right to rescission under the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act.8 They quickly decided to rescind, tendering title to
the home back to the seller and demanding a full refund of the purchase
price.89 Whether these buyers could rescind presented the court with a case
of first impression.890
The seller conceded that the Act applied 91 The Act required the
buyers be given notice of their statutory right of rescission, and the seller
conceded that buyers had not been given such notice.8 92  The Act also
required that an action to enforce the rights it provided must be brought
within three years after the contract is signed.893 These buyers gave the
seller notice of rescission less than thirty-one months after signing the
contract, yet the seller claimed that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.894 The court rejected the statute of limitations defense based on
the plain language of the Act.8 95 The court similarly rejected the seller's
waiver defense.8  These buyers did not know they had a right to rescission
when they accepted the deed or started living in the house.89T Rescission is a
knowing act, so these actions could not be the basis for rescission.898
The court also rejected the seller's attempt to limit the buyers' recovery
by invoking the liquidated damages clause in the contract and claiming a set-
off for the buyers' use of the premises. 899 Admittedly, the buyers had lived
in the house for two years, but the statute was very clear that a rescinding
buyer was entitled to "all money paid by him or her" if the property was
returned substantially unchanged.9' The Act simply did not provide for any
set-off for use and occupancy and it did not allow the seller to limit its
liability by a liquidated damages clause. 90'
887. Id.
888. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1700-1720 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
889. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 312.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
895. Id.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id.
899. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
900. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1703(e) (1994)).
901. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
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Grosseibl v. J. Chris Howard Builders, Inc.902  When the buyer
purchased the home, he got a warranty from the Preferred Builders Warranty
Corporation. 903 The warranty contained an arbitration clause that required
any dispute "arising out of or related to this warranty" be submitted to
arbitration. 904 Problems did arise. The buyer claimed that the home was
poorly built of substandard materials, not up to code, and on "improper and
insufficient soil."9 5 The buyer apparently attributed the problems to the
builder's improperly filling the land after removing the swimming pool that
had previously been on the property.9°6 The buyer did not file a claim
against the warrantor. 907  Instead, he filed this action against the
builder/seller seeking damages for breach of contract, rescission of the sale,
and damages for fraud based on alleged misrepresentations made in the
seller's disclosure statement.9°8 On the seller's motion, the trial court stayed
his suit _pending arbitration, but the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed.9
In Florida, arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable. 910 A party who
has agreed to arbitration has no choice but to arbitrate. 911 However, the
critical question here was whether the buyer had agreed to arbitrate the
controversies involved in this suit.912 "In determining whether a dispute
must be submitted to arbitration, the scope of the arbitration provision
governs. ' '913 This arbitration provision only covered disputes "arising out of
or related to this warranty."9'4 The warranty revealed that it specifically
excluded from coverage defects caused by soil problems, and it did not
warrant that the home complied with any building code.915 Nor did it cover
misrepresentations that the builder might have made, and that formed the
916basis for the rescission and fraud claims. Attempts to avoid an arbitration
902. 739 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
903. Id. at 1256.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1256.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 1256-57.
910. Id. at 1256.
911. Id.
912. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1256.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Id.
916. Id.
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clause by adding a fraud claim failed in cases involving an agreement to
arbitrate all disputes, but this limited arbitration clause was clearly
different. 9' 7  This plaintiffs claims went far beyond what the warranty
covered, and the agreement to arbitrate only related to claims under the
warranty.
918
XXI. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Pomerance v. Homosassa Special Water District.919 The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it granted a final judgment in favor of the
district for its special assessment for water lines by owners ofdroperty,
which consisted primarily of wetlands that could not be developed.
In 1988, the District annexed Halls River Estates, located north of the
Pomerance property.921 After annexing the property, the District ran water
lines to serve Halls River Estates and to serve land that includes the
Pomerance property which was previously within district boundaries.9"2 The
District specially assessed the Pomerance property and other properties
which abutted the water lines. 3 The Pomerances sued for relief contending
that their property would not be benefited by the water line because the
property consisted mostly of wetlands which were not able to be
developed. " The trial court concluded that the Pomerances "did not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no benefit to the property
from the extension of water service to it.
'9
The Fifth District held that the trial court properly found that the
property owners did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
did not receive a benefit to their property from the extension of the water
lines.m The appellate court noted that the burden is on the property owner
to overcome the rebuttable presumption that its property benefited from the
improvement and the presumption that the district court correctly determined
917. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1257.
918. Id.
919. 755 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
920. Id. at 733.
921. Id.
922. Id.
923. Id.
924. Pomerance, 755 So. 2d at 733.
925. Id. at 734.
926. Id.
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that the property received a special benefit.9  The court stated that the trial
court's finding was supported by the evidence and that the Pomerances did
not overcome the presumptions.
928
XXII. SUBMERGED LANDS
West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund.929 The issue here was whether the Fourth District Court of
Appeal properly concluded that the city's dredging of submerged land did
not constitute a permanent improvement under the Butler Act and, therefore,
title to the submerged lands did not vest in the city.
930
In 1946, the city "obtained a permit to construct a municipal marina on
state sovereignty lands submerged under the intracoastal waterway."931 "The
marina was built between 1947 and 1949, pursuant to the Butler Act and its
predecessor Riparian Rights Act of 1856, which divested the State of... fee
simple title to submerged lands upon which upland owners constructed
certain improvements in the interest of encouraging" the development and
improvement of Florida's waterfront.
932
The Supreme Court of Florida held that dredging submerged lands did
not constitute a permanent improvement and that fee simple ownership of
submerged lands is properly confirmed in the Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund.933 The court stated that "divestiture of
sovereign lands under the Butler Act is in derogation of the public trust and
the Butler Act 'must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign."'934
The reenacted Butler Act of 1921 added the condition that the
submerged land was "actually bulk-headed or filled in or permanently
improved continuously from high water mark in the direction of the
channel. 9 35 Further, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that "permanently
improved" denotes, at the very least, significant structures which are the
927. Id.; see Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now/Acorn v. Fla. City, 444 So. 2d 37,
38-39 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Meyer v. Oakland Park, 219 So. 2d 417 (Fla.
1969)).
928. Pomerance, 755 So. 2d at 734.
929. 746 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1999).
930. Id. at 1087.
931. Id. at 1086.
932. Id.
933. Id. at 1091-92.
934. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund., 746 So. 2d at 1089 (citing
Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 786 (Fla. 1956)).
935. Id.; see Ch. 21-8537, § 1, 1921 Laws of Florida 332, 333.
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functional equivalent of the "wharves... warehouses, dwellings, or other
buildings," which are referred to in the first paragraph of section one of the
Act.936 Finally, the court rejected the case by case basis which the district
court of appeal adopted in State Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc.
937
XXIII. TAXATION
Bullock v. Houston Realty & Investment, Inc.938 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly concluded that certain tax deeds were valid
to Houston regardless of any interest by Bullock.939
Houston filed suit to quiet title on property it had acquired by a
quitclaim deed from PB Horizons, Inc., an entity which had purchased the
property by a tax deed.94° Houston was aware that Bullock might have had
an interest in the property by virtue of certain recorded final judgments.94'
Bullock raised the affirmative defense that prior to the tax deed sale she had
not received proper statutory notice of the sale.942 Notice of the sale should
have been sent to her attorneys whose names and addresses appeared on the
face of the final judgment.943 Bullock also counter-claimed "seeking
cancellation of the tax deed and foreclosure of her final judgment."9W
Further, the court "ordered Bullock to deposit $28,900 with the clerk of the
court within thirty days 'as preliminary costs' required by section 197.602
of the Florida Statutes to invalidate a tax deed.945 Bullock failed to make the
required deposit, and the court entered an Order on Validity of Tax Deeds.946
Further, it deemed Bullock had received notice of the tax sale prior to the
sale and adjudged the tax deed held by Houston to be valid.947
The appellate court held that Bullock had received notice of the tax
sale.94 This was based on section 197.522(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
936. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 746 So. 2d at 1090.
937. Id. at 1091-92.
938. 739 So. 2d 1251 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
939. Id. at 1252.
940. Id.
941. Id.
942. Id.
943. Bullock, 739 So. 2d at 1252.
944. Id.
945. Id. at 1253.
946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Bullock, 739 So. 2d at 1253.
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stating that if no address is listed in the tax collector's statement then no
notice is required.949 Further, Bullock subsequently received notice by virtue
of the filing of Houston's action to quiet title.950 Finally, though there is
nothing in section 197.602 of the Florida Statutes that expressly imposes a
requirement on a lienor to deposit the tax arrearage with the clerk of the
court, the procedure was not inconsistent with the statute.951
Department of Revenue v. Race.952 The issue here was whether the trial
court properly held that taxes are not due when a husband files a quitclaim
deed of his residence from himself to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entireties where his wife's name was left off the deed by error.
953
In 1991, the Races moved from California and purchased a home in
Maitland, Florida.954 Karen, the wife, was pregnant at the time and it was
anticipated she would not attend the closing.955  Therefore, "the deed,
mortgage and note were prepared solely in David's, the husband's, name.
' '9s6
However, at the last moment Karen attended the closing.957 Her name was
added to the signature page of the mortgage and its balloon rider but left off
the promissory note and deed.958 Therefore, title to the property was not
conveyed to Karen.959 To cure this, David executed a quitclaim deed and
paid the minimum documentary stamp taxes.9 ° The deed recited that the
transfer was "'for and in consideration of the sum of $10.00." '961 Four
months after this the Department of Revenue claimed documentary stamps
were due, based on the value of the mortgage on the residence.
962
The court held that taxes were not due under section 201.02(1) of the
Florida Statutes when a deed merely corrects an error and no new purchaser
or new or additional consideration is involved.963 Further, the court held that
949. Id.
950. Id. at 1254.
951. Id. at 1254-55.
952. 743 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
953. Id. at 169.
954. Id. at 170.
955. Id.
956. Id.
957. Race, 743 So. 2d at 170.
958. Id.
959. Id.
960. Id.
961. Id.
962. Race, 743 So. 2d at 170.
963. Id.; see An. Foam Indus. v. Dep't of Revenue, 345 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
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tax laws are to be construed strongly in favor of taxpayers and against the
government, with all ambiguities resolved in favor of taxpayers. Here,
Karen was already liable on the mortgage together with her husband, and
documentary stamp taxes had already been paid on this encumbrance. 965
Karen's name was left off due to error and there was no new, additional, or
previously nonexistent encumbrances which would have required a new
documentary tax due under section 201.02(1).96 Further, the Department's
Rule 12A-4.014(3) provided that conveyances made to correct a deficiency
in a previous deed are subject only to the minimum tax due.967
Fuchs v. Robbins.968 The issue before this court dealt with whether the
lower court improperly upheld the property appraiser's original assessment
and improperly declared section 192.042 of the Florida Statutes
unconstitutional.969
In 1992, Joel W. Robbins, a Miami Dade County property appraiser,
assessed the property in question. 970 He assessed the land at a value of
$2,277,000 and the building at $3,790,227. 97 The taxpayer appealed the
assessment to the value adjustment board, which reduced the assessment of
the building to a value of $50,000.972 Robbins brought an action in the
circuit court to defend the original assessment.973
At trial, Robbins established that he conformed to the eight factors
provided in section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes and when the taxpayer
argued that the value of the building set by the value adjustment board was
correct pursuant to section 192.042, Robbins alleged that section 192.042
was unconstitutional.974 The general master found that section 192.042 was
unconstitutional because the section improperly creates a class of property
not enumerated in Article VIL section 4 of the Florida Constitution.975 The
taxpayer challenged the order, alleging the property appraiser, as a
964. Race, 743 So. 2d at 171; see Dep't of Revenue v. Ray Constr., 667 So. 2d 859
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
965. Race, 743 So. 2d at 171.
966. Id.
967. Id.
968. 738 So. 2d338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
969. Id. at 339.
970. Id.
971. Id.
972. Id.
973. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 339.
974. Id.
975. Id.
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constitutional officer, does not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of section 192.042.976
Robbins did have standing because when a statute is brought into issue
by another party, such as it was in the case at hand, an officer may question
the validity of the statute as a defense.m" In Fuchs, the taxpayer introduced
section 192.042.978 Section 192.042 provides that real property be assessed
on January 1 of each year, with the exception that portions not substantially
completed on January 1 shall not have any value.9 79
In 1968 there was an amendment to the Florida Constitution which
required that regulations secure a "just valuation" of all property. 980 This
court found that section 192.042 is constitutional. 98' The statute in the case
at hand treats all property not substantially completed the same, and
therefore, a just valuation is present.982 Therefore, this court reversed the
lower court's decision holding that the property was not substantially
completed and should not have been assessed pursuant to section 192.042.9
Gulf Coast Recycling, Inc. v. Turner.9" The issue here was whether the
trial court erred when it entered a judgment reinstating the property
appraiser's original ad valorem tax assessment that the property had a value
of $1,704,166. 9"
The property at issue here was the Normandy Park apartment
complex. 986 Following receipt of the property appraiser's 1997 assessment
of the property, Gulf Coast filed a petition with the value adjustment board
to have the assessment reviewed.9r Its argument was that the property was
contaminated and that the cost of the cleanup required by the Environmental
Protection Agency exceeded the value of the property. 988 Therefore, no
potential purchaser would buy the property and it was without present cash
value. 989 After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing master found that the
976. Id.
977. Id. at 340; see Dep't of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455,458 (Fla. 1982).
978. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 340.
979. FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (2000).
980. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 340.
981. Id.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 341.
984. 753 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
985. Id.
986. Id.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 712.
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property appraiser had failed to consider all of the factors required in section
193.011 of the Florida Statutes when he made his assessment.9  He further
found that Gulf Coast's evidence concerning the cost of the required cleanup
was convincing and reduced the assessed value of the property to a nominal
$100.991 The value adjustment board later adopted these findings. 992 The
property appraiser filed suit under section 194.036 of the Florida Statutes
requesting that the original assessment be reinstated because the property
was currently being used as an apartment complex, and therefore, pursuant
to section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes, its use had not been reduced due
to the contamination. 993 The trial court agreed and reinstated the original
assessment.9
The appellate court held that the trial court erred when it reinstated the
original assessment by the property appraiser.9" The court based its opinion
on the requirement by section 193.011 to consider all the factors listed in
that section when reaching an assessment. 9  The property appraiser failed
to consider the property's present cash value, which is the amount a willing
purchaser would pay a willing seller for the property. 997  Gulf Coast
presented several experts that testified that the property had no present cash
value. 9 The presumption of the correctness of the property appraiser's
assessment is lost when he or she fails to consider all the factors in section
193.011, which occurred here.9
Havill v. Lake Port Properties, Inc. 1°o The question before this court
was whether the trial court properly concluded that the property appraiser's
exclusive reliance on the cost approach was not appropriate and that the
income approach was superior. °°
Lake Port contended that its 1995 ad valorem tax assessment on Lake
Port Square was in excess of "just value" and that the property appraiser
failed to follow the requirements of section 193.011 of the Florida
990. Id.
991. Id.
992. Id. at713.
993. Id.
994. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 713.
995. Id.
996. Id.
997. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 193.011(1), (6) (2000).
998. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 713.
999. Id.
1000. 729 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
1001. Id. at 467.
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Statutes.1' 2 In particular, it contested the correctness of the assessment of
the independent living facility.1003 The property appraiser contended that the
trial court erroneously placed the burden on him to prove the validity of his
assessment, incorrectly placed emphasis on methodology, instead of proof of
correctness of the value, failed to treat the assessment as presumptively
correct, and made its determination on evidence insufficient to overcome
that presumption. '0 4
There are three traditional approaches to value-cost, income, and
market-that will individually, or in any combination, support an
assessment. 1005 The property appraiser decides the weight given to each
approach depending on the type of property being assessed. 'M
In this case, both sides agreed that the market approach was
inappropriate because of the unique nature of the property and lack of
comparable sales. 100 7 Lake Port argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
only valid way to appraise the facility was the income approach. 1 °8 The
property appraiser stated that he considered but rejected the income
approach for several reasons including: 1) a lack of comparable properties;
2) he did not believe he had been given all needed information; 3) the
information supplied was incomplete or incorrect; and 4) the complex and
unorthodox "income stream" of Lake Port Square made it difficult to
accurately assess using the income method.1009 Further, he pointed out that
information supplied did not accurately reflect the integrated nature of the
facility, but attempted to separate income related only to the living center. 0 10
Indeed, Lake Port's expert testified at trial that he had only conducted an1011
appraisal of the living center. Royce said that in his opinion this was a
"special purpose" property, best valued using the cost approach. 0 12 Finally,
1002. Id. at 468-69.
1003. Id. at 469.
1004. Id. at 469-70.
1005. Id.; see Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1144 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1006. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 470; see Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 919,
921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
1007. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 470.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. Id. at 471.
1011. Id.
1012. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 471.
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Royce testified the county may make a fifteen percent reduction based on the
"eighth criteria adjustment" but this is done on a case by case basis. 10 13
The appellate court held that it is not for the trial court to determine
which method is superior, as long as the property appraiser's valuation takes
into account the statutory factors.10 1 4 The property appraiser must rely on his
judgment as to the best method and is given "great leeway" as long as he
follows the requirements of the law. 01 5 Finally, the trial court overlooked
the Second District's holding in Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc.10 16 The
court held that the county appraiser was within his authority to use the cost
approach to value a "nursing home" and treat it as a "special purpose"
property.
0 17
Kerr v. Broward County.018 The issue in this appeal was whether a
party claiming entitlement to property as an assignee of a judgment against
the prior owner of the property can be denied his right to participate in a
surplus, which existed after a tax sale was overbid, and where the party's
address was not placed on the assignment of judgment.10 19
A tax sale was conducted on certain real property located in Broward
County, for which there existed a surplus after all tax obligations on the
property were paid.'m The excess funds were placed in the court registry
since both the county and Kerr made claims to the surplus funds1 °21 Kerr,
who claimed entitlement to the funds as the assignee of a judgment against
the prior owner, did not have her address placed on the assignment of
judgment or the assignment of note and mortgage, and therefore, Kerr's
name was not in the tax collector's statement pursuant to section 197.502 of
the Florida Statutes.1° The county replied that Kerr did not qualify as a
person entitled to excess proceeds of a tax sale under sections 197.582(2) or
197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes10 23 The county further asserted that it
1013. Id.
1014. Id.; see Walker v. Trmp, 549 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
1015. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 471 (citing Walker, 549 So. 2d at 1103).
1016. Id. (citing Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc., 462 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)).
1017. Id.
1018. 718 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1019. Id. at 197.
1020. Id.
1021. Id. at 198.
1022. Id.
1023. Kerr, 718 So. 2d at 198.
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had two judgment liens against the prior owner of the property which were
recorded in July and December of 1988.1
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment for declaratory relief
to determine the rights of each party.1°2 The appellate court looked to
sections 197.582, 197.522, and 197.502 of the Florida Statutes and found
that the appellant, who had superior lien rights, should not be denied her
right to participate in the excess funds merely because the instrument that
created her liens did not contain her address.
1°2
Furthermore, this court referenced two cases, Dawson v. Saada0 7 and
DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co.'0 8 In Dawson, the
Supreme Court of Florida emphasized that only "notice reasonably
calculated to apprise landowners of the pending deprivation of their
property" is required. 1 29 The DeMario court held that the clerk of the court
is required to assemble all interested parties when there are excess funds so
that the funds may be distributed according to the legal priorities of the
claims.10 30 Therefore, this court reversed and remanded the grant of
summary judgment with directions for the trial court to determine the
priorities of the parties.1031
Metropolitan Dade County v. Brothers of the Good Shepherd, Inc.1032
The issue presented was whether the assignee of a ninety-nine year lease,
who uses the property for charitable purposes, is entitled to a charitable
exemption from ad valorem taxation under sections 196.012(1), 196.196,
and 196.192(1) of the Florida Statutes.1°33 The appellate court found that,
although the property was used for charitable purposes, the assignee was not
the "equitable owner" of the property, and therefore was not entitled to the
exemption. °34
Northcutt v. Balkany. 3s The issue presented before this court was
whether tax certificates issued for unpaid ad valorem taxes were
1024. Id.
1025. Id.
1026. Id. at 199.
1027. 608 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1992).
1028. 648 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1029. Dawson, 608 So. 2d at 808.
1030. DeMario, 648 So. 2d at 213.
1031. Kerr, 718 So. 2d at 199.
1032. 714 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1033. Id.
1034. Id. at 573-74; see Leon County Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So. 2d
526, 530 (Fla. 1997); Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
1035. 727 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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unenforceable when the owner of the tax certificates, who was involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding for twenty months, failed to apply for a tax deed
within the seven year limit under section 197.482(1) of the Florida
Statutes. °36 The tax collector asserted that the bankruptcy tolled the seven
year period.
10 37
The landowner involved failed to pay ad valorem taxes in 1987 and
1988 and two certificates were issued.1o38 The landowner filed for
bankruptcy in 1991.°9 In 1992, the bankruptcy court ordered the property
involved to be conveyed to the appellee, as trustee. 1w In 1992, the
landowner was discharged from bankruptcy. 1 ' In February of 1997, the
landowner, who was still the holder of the certificates, applied for tax
deeds. 1042 In order to avoid losing the property, the appellee paid for the tax
deeds.1°43 The appellee then filed a complaint against the tax collector for
the expenses incurred in purchasing the tax deeds, attorneys' fees, and court
costs. 104 The appellee alleged that the tax collector's refusal to declare the
tax certificates null and void violated his duty under section 197.482 of the
Florida Statutes.1045  The trial court granted summary judgment to the
appellee.
104
Section 197.482 provides that after seven years, if a tax deed is not
applied for and no other legal proceeding has existed of record, the tax
collector shall cancel the tax certificate. 1047 The tax collector argued that the
bankruptcy was a legal proceeding affecting the property covered by the
certificates. 1m The appellate court agreed."
Until 1973, the limitation time for applying for a tax deed was twenty
years. 10 50 The former statute, section 197.430, provided a twenty year statute
1036. Id. at 383.
1037. Id.
1038. Id.
1039. Id.
1040. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 383.
1041. Id.
1042. Id.
1043. Id.
1044. Id.
1045. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 384.
1046. Id.
1047. FLA. STAT. § 197.482(l) (2000).
1048. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 384.
1049. Id. at 386.
1050. Id. at384.
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of limitations but was very strict. 10 51 When the legislature changed the
twenty year time period to seven years, it also expanded the scope of
exceptional circumstances in which the normal limitation period would not
apply. 10 52 The exceptions included a situation where a legal proceeding "has
existed" affecting the property. 0 53 The appellate court found that since the
legislature used the words "has existed" rather than "is pending" it provided
for a tolling of the seven year limitation for periods where the property was
the subject of a legal proceeding of record. 054 Therefore, since the court
found that the bankruptcy proceeding acted as a stay of any legal actions
regarding the property, and was never lifted, the seven year statute of
limitations in section 197.482 was tolled during the period in which the
property was subject to the bankruptcy's stay.10  The final judgment was
vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion.'
x56
Sartori v. Department of Revenue.1°57 The issue that was decided by
this court was whether it was correct to dismiss James Sartori's declaratory
judgment action against the Department of Revenue ("DOR") and the
Brevard County Tax Collector as untimely. 105'
Sartori brought suit hoping to obtain an order directing the DOR to
refund ad valorem taxes, which had been paid on pollution control
equipment located on his dairy farm.1° 59 Sartori asserted that he filed the
action within the applicable four year statute of limitations provided in
section 197.182(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes. ' 6 In 1990, Sartori installed
pollution control equipment on his dairy farm and three years later the tax
collector claimed that the equipment was subject to real estate taxes.1061
Sartori disagreed and asserted that he was not obligated to pay the taxes on
the equipment pursuant to section 193.621 of the Florida Statutes because
his equipment was subject to taxation at salvage value rather than its fair
market value. 1 2 However, the tax collector assessed taxes against Sartori's
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 385.
1054. Id.
1055. Id.
1056. Id. at 386.
1057. 714 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1058. Id. at 1137.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 1138.
1061. Id. at 1137.
1062. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1137.
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property based upon the fair market value."° 3 In June 1993, Sartori was
directed to pay taxes for the years of 1990 through 1993.'064 Sartori first
filed a petition with the county's value adjustment board, which was never
presented. °65 Thereafter, in October 1993 the taxes were certified for
collection.106
In the meantime, pursuant to section 193.621(6) of the Florida Statutes,
the tax collector filed a request with the state Department of Environmental
Regulation ("DER") for a recommendation concerning the equipment and
section 193.621.1°67 Sartori paid the bill and in July 1994 the DER advised
the tax collector that Sartori's argument was correct and that the equipment
was subject to assessment at salvage value.1 6 The tax collector requested
that the DOR refund Sartori, however, the DOR denied the request as
untimely. °69  Therefore, Sartori filed a declaratory judgment action
requesting that DOR be directed to refund the taxes paid ° 7 The trial court
concluded that Sartori's suit was untimely filed pursuant to section 194.171
of the Florida Statutes because the August 1996 suit constituted a "contest
to a tax assessment" and that Sartori only had until December 18, 1993 to
file the lawsuit.1071 Sartori argued that section 194.171 was not applicable
because he was not asserting a "contest to a tax assessment," but rather was
requesting a tax refund since the tax collector had improperly classified his
equipment.1 72 Further, Sartori asserted that under section 197.182 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 12D-8.021 of the Florida Administrative Code, he
had four years to institute a lawsuit for a refund.10 73 This court looked to
both of these authorities and section 95.11(3)(m) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides a four year statute of limitation for actions regarding money
paid to a governmental authority by mistake or inadvertence.
1074
The DOR brought this court's attention to Department of Revenue v.
Goembe. 1°75 In that case, the Fifth District found that Goembel did not
1063. Id.
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. Id.
1067. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1137.
1068. Id.
1069. Id.
1070. Id. at 1138.
1071. Id.
1072. Satori, 714 So. 2d at 1138.
1073. Id.
1074. Id. at 1138-39.
1075. 382 So. 2d 783 (Fa. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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discuss the specific issue that was presented in this case and was not
controlling.10 76 Therefore, the appellate court found for Sartori stating that
his claim was not barred by the statute of limitation in section 194.17 1, since
the suit did not challenge the tax collector's valuation of his property. 077 In
the past, courts had distinguished cases involving suits that contest tax
assessments and suits contesting property classifications.1°7s This court
looked at past cases and the legislature's intent to afford favorable tax status
to owners of pollution control equipment.1 79 This intent is seen in section
403.021 of the Florida Statutes.)°s Further, both section 193.621 and
section 193.441 of the Florida Statutes explain that pollution control
equipment is classified as a special class of property.108
The appellate court also answered the DOR's argument that the refund
sought was based upon the retroactive application of a tax exemption and
that such request falls within the limitation of time in section 194.171 of the
Florida Statutes.118 However, the court stated that the tax status accorded to
pollution control equipment is not by a tax exemption, but rather a favorable
tax status because of the equipment's classification. 1" Therefore, the
appellate court reversed and remanded the case in favor of Sartori.'
084
Schultz v. Love PGI Partners.'08 The issue before the Supreme Court
of Florida was whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal decision, which
conflicted with Robbins v. Yussem,1°s6 was correct that zoned use of land is
not determinative of actual, good faith agricultural use of land for ad
valorem tax assessment purposes.
108 7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that when determining the
actual, good faith use of the land for tax purposes, the zoned use is but one
factor that an assessor or reviewing court may consider along with other
factors specified in section 193.461(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes, and that
1076. Sarior, 714 So. 2d at 1139.
1077. Id.
1078. See Dep't of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A., 654 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Stafford, 646 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
1079. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1139.
1080. Id. at 1140.
1081. Id. at 1140-41.
1082. Id. at 1141.
1083. Id.
1084. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1141.
1085. 731 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1999).
1086. 559 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1087. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1271.
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zoning alone is not determinative as a matter of law. °"" The Fifth District
reasoned that the assessment must be based on an evaluation of the various
factors as provided in section 193.461(3)(b), which include: 1) the duration
and continuity of the use; 2) the purchase price and size of the land;
3) whether the land is cared for in a matter to support the alleged use;
4) whether there is a lease, and, if so, its terms; and 5) "such other factors"
as may be apparent. 1089 Since the zoned use of land was not included as a
specific factor by the legislature, it enters the analysis in the catch-all
category contained in section 193.461(3)(b)7.' 90 The Fifth District stressed
that the key is the actual physical activity being conducted on the land and a
determination based exclusively on -zoned use as a matter of law would
violate the broad examination required by the statute.
1091
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's reasoning was sound and consistent with Greenwood v. Oates.1m
Therefore, it approved the Fifth District's decision below and disapproved
Robbins to the extent it was inconsistent with its opinion.
1093
Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre.1'9 This case addressed the
constitutionality of section 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes.10 95 The
raceway applied for an ad valorem tax exemption under section 196.199 of
the Florida Statutes and was denied. 109 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the0roperty appraiser and the DOR under a declaratory
judgment action.
The property was owned by the City of Sebring and leased to the
raceway.1098 It was used as a racetrack with permanent seating and annual
races.10" Section 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes provides that the use of
property as a sports facility with permanent seating by a lessee is deemed a
use that serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose when it is open
to the general public.11 °
1088. Id.
1089. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b) (2000).
1090. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1271.
1091. Id.
1092. 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
1093. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1272.
1094. 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1095. Id. at 297.
1096. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Id.
1099. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 297.
1100. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 196.012(6) (2000).
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The raceway fell within this provision, but the question before this
court was whether the legislature can by statutory enactment change the
meaning of the terms in Article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida
Constitution. 10' The state constitution permits the legislature to provide
exemptions by general law in certain situations, however, there is nothing in
Article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to make such an exemption
as it did in this case. 11°2 Other than what is provided in the Florida
Constitution, the legislature cannot enact general laws that permit
exemptions from ad valorem taxation. 1°3 The Supreme Court of Florida in
Franks v. Davis"°4 stated that the state's constitution is a limitation on the
power of the legislature 105 The specifications of permissible exemptions in
the constitution excludes other exemptions.' 105 The legislature cannot alter
the tax exemption provisions of the constitution. 1 07
The Florida Constitution in Article VII, section 3 clearly establishes
that exemptions are permissible for municipal property owned and used by
the municipality. In the present case, the property was owned by the
municipality but not used by the municipality and therefore should not have
been entitled to an exemption.11 9 Therefore, the appellate court held that the
statute was unconstitutional, since the legislature cannot by statutory
enactment change or alter the meaning of a provision in the state
constitution, as it did in McIntyre.i 10
Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.1111 The issue here was whether
the property appraiser was required to make a deduction for the cost of sales
when determining the fair market value.11
2
In this case, Turner and Fuchs were sued by Tokai. l  Turner and
Fuchs assessed the value of some 500 pieces of office equipment.! 114 Tokai
1101. Mclntyre, 718 So. 2d at 297.
1102. Id. at 298.
1103. Id.
1104. 145 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1962).
1105. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 298.
1106. Id.; see Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1968).
1107. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 298.
1108. Id. at 299.
1109. Id. at 299-300.
1110. Id. at 300.
1111. 767 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1112. Id. at 497.
1113. Id. at 496.
1114. Id.
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disagreed with the value Turner and Fuchs appraised the equipment and
based its claim under section 193.011(8) of the Florida Statutes, which
identifies the net proceeds of the sale of property as one factor to be
considered when determining just valuation or market value.1115
The appellate court found that from the title of the section itself that the
property appraiser need only consider the factors but does not have to apply
them. Further, the method used for valuation and the weight given to the
individual factors is left to the discretion of the tax appraiser." 7 Therefore,
the appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court's opinion that
required a twenty percent reduction from the fair market value of Tokai's
equipment.118
XXV. TIMESHARES
New legislation impacts timeshares in various ways. There is no longer
a prior review by the Department of Business Regulation of timeshare
advertising1119 Liability of concurrent or successor timeshare developers is
reduced.1 Additionally, timeshare disclosures are now simplified.
112P
XXV. TITLE INSURANCE
Department of Insurance v. Keys Title & Abstract Co." z2 The issue
here was whether the trial court properly held that section 627.782(8) of the
Florida Statutes is unconstitutional on its face, because it imposes a burden
on nonlawyer title insurance agents that is not also imposed on lawyers who
sell title insurance. 123
Title insurance can be sold in Florida either by a title insurance agent
who is licensed by the Department of Insurance or by a lawyer who is in
good standing with the Florida Bar."7 Title insurance rates are regulated by
1115. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.011(8) (1997)).
1116. Turner, 767 So. 2d at 497.
1117. Id. (citing Valencia Ctr., Inc. v. Bystrom, 543 So. 2d 214,216 (Fla. 1989)).
1118. Id. at500.
1119. Ch. 2000-302, § 17, 2000 Fla. Laws 3031, 3085-3086 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 721.11 (2000)).
1120. Id. § 9,2000 Fla. Laws at 3049 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.05 (2000)).
1121. See id. § 6, 2000 Fla. Laws at 3039-41 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 719.503
(2000)).
1122. 741 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
1123. Id. at 600.
1124. Id. at 600-01.
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the Department of Insurance under chapter 627 of the Florida Statutes."25
Section 627.782(8) authorizes the department to promulgate a rule requiring
its licensees to provide relevant information for use in setting rates.11 Based
on this authority, the department adopted Rule 4-186.013 of the Florida
Administrative Code, which requires all licensees under chapter 626 to
provide statistical data for use in setting rates.1127  However, section
626.8417(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that lawyers who are in good
standing are exempt from licensure requirements under chapter 626.1
Therefore, since lawyers are not "licensees" of the department, they are not
subject to the department's reporting requirements authorized by section
627.782(8) and required by Rule 4-186.013.129 Keys challenged the statute
arguing that it violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
law." 3° Keys maintained the statute made an arbitrary distinction between
lawyers and nonlawyers who sell title insurance. The trial court declared
the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the right to equal protection of
the law."
132
The appellate court held that the statute was constitutional because it
serves a legitimate governmental purpose and the legislature had valid
reasons to exclude lawyers from the reporting requirement.1 33 First, an
equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a fundamental
right or a suspect classification is evaluated by the rational basis test.1 4 A
proper application of the test requires consideration of two distinct issues,
whether the statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose and whether it
was reasonable for the legislators to believe that the challenged classification
would promote the purpose." 35 There is no doubt that the first requirement
is met in that the statute serves a legitimate purpose in enabling the
1125. Id. at 601; see FLA. STAT. § 627.782 (2000).
1126. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601; see FLA. STAT § 627.782(8)
(2000).
1127. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601.
1128. Id.
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
1131. Id.
1132. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601.
1133. Id. at 602.
1134. Id.; see Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Idaho Dep't of Employment v.
Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1977).
1135. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 602; see W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981); see also Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981).
[Vol. 25:115
Brown! Grohman
Department of Insurance to make informed decisions regarding the premium
1136
rates for title insurance. Second, the legislature had valid reasons to
exclude lawyers from the reporting requirement1 37 Some of these reasons
include: 1) that the inclusion of lawyers would make the reporting
requirement more difficult because it is difficult to identify those Bar
members who sell title insurance; 2) that the information provided by the
lawyers would not be as accurate because many lawyers who sell title
insurance do it as part of a broader legal practice; and 3) the expense
information rovided may not be limited to that involved in selling title
insurance."113
XXVI. TRUTH IN LENDING
Essex Home Mortgage Servicing Corp. v. Fritz.1139 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly awarded damages to the Fritzes for each
interest rate change that occurred during the term of the loan.1'
4
This case involved an original variable rate loan from Essex's
predecessor in interest, Financial Securit Savings and Loan Association, for
the purchase of the Fritzes' residence." 1 The Fritzes were provided with a
truth in lending disclosure statement for variable rate mortgages which
advised them that interest rates may increase when the index increased.1142
In actuality, the interest rates could also increase in the second year even if
the index decreased because of the effect of the interest rate discount
applicable to only the first year."143 The Fritzes defaulted on the loan and
Essex sued for foreclosure with the Fritzes countersuing for damages under
the Truth in Lending Act ('TILA") for statutory damages! 1 4 The trial court
entered a final judgment in foreclosure against the Fritzes, but awarded a set
off in the amount of $22,000, finding that the original lender had "'misstated
the effect of the index on the APR of the variable rate loan,' and that '[e]ach
successive change in the interest rate resulted in a new transaction and an
additional violation."'
114 5
1136. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 602.
1137. Id.
1138. Id. at603.
1139. 740 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
1140. Id. at 1225.
1141. Id.
1142. Id.
1143. Id.
1144. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1225.
1145. Id.
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The appellate court held that the trial court erred in awarding statutory
damages for each interest rate change that occurred during the term of the
loan. 14 It based this on the fact that the TILA states at Title 15 of the
United States Code section 1640(a)(2) that if a lender fails to comply with
the requirements of TILA, the lender is liable to the borrower for statutory
damages equal to twice the amount financed, but not less than $200 and not
more than $2000.1147 Further, section 1640(g) limits statutory damages in
cases of multiple failures to disclose to a single recovery unless the lender
continues to fail to disclose after recovery has been granted. This case
did not involve post-recovery disclosure violations. 1149 Further, there were
no subsequent rate changes that constituted new transactions.' ° "[Aifter
the first rate change, the statement that 'the interest rate may increase if the
index increased' would be correct because the previous year's interest rate
would no longer be a discounted rate."1' 51 Further, increases in interest rates
are not considered new transactions when a creditor, as was done in this
case, gives prior disclosure that rates are subject to change.' 52 Therefore,
the Fritzes' total recovery was limited to $2000.1153
XXVII. UTILITY FRANCHISES
Central Waterworks, Inc. v. Town of Century.154 The issue here was
who has the right to provide water to the Department of Juvenile Justice
("DJJ") when one party has an exclusive franchise agreement and the other
has been given the right to purchase its water from others."55 In this case,
Central Waterworks was granted an exclusive franchise in 1966 to provide
water within a certain geographic location." 56 In 1996, the town leased land
for the DJJ which provided that it could purchase water from the town." 57
1146. Id.
1147. Id.
1148. Id.; see Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2) (West 1995 & Supp.
2000).
1149. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1225.
1150. Id.
1151. Id. at 1226.
1152. Id.; see Key Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Dean, 695 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fia. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
1153. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1227.
1154. 754 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1155. Id. at 816.
1156. Id.
1157. Id.
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The court began by restating that a franchise constitutes a private
property right."58 If the franchisee has the ability to meet its obligations and
provide the service proscribed, the franchisee's right can only be alienated
by consent, unless full compensation is paid.1159 The first thing the court
looked at was the element of consent by Central." 60 The appellate court
found that the trial court did not base its determination on this issue on
competent, substantial evidence, and therefore, was incorrect in its decision
for the town.
1161
The appellate court further found that the trial court erred when it ruled
in regards to sections 958.41(14), (16), and (19) of the Florida Statutes."62
The trial court interpreted the statute so that it authorized the DJJ to contract
with whomever it chooses and to ignore Central's franchise rights. 1163 The
appellate court stated this was a misinterpretation of the statute and that it
merely provided that the siting of juvenile facilities was to be given priority
by other affected governmental agencies and that such provisions did not
authorize the abrogation of Central's vested franchise rights in the manner
determined by the trial court.116
Finally, the apellate court determined that the trial court erred in its
application of law. 65 The appellate court, following City of Mount Dora v.
JJ's Mobile Homes, Inc.,"' stated:
When each of two public service entities, whether governmental or
private, has a legal basis for the claim of a right to provide similar
services in the same territory, and each has the present ability to do
so promptly and efficiently, the entity with the earlier acquired
legal right has the exclusive legal right to provide service in that
territory without interference from the entity with the later acquired
right.1
1 67
Therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case.
11 68
1158. Id.
1159. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 816.
1160. Id.
1161. Id. at 816-17.
1162. Id. at 817.
1163. Id.
1164. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 817.
1165. Id.
1166. 579 So. 2d 219, 223-24 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1167. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 817.
1168. Id.
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XXVIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey presents selected cases and legislation of
significance to real estate professionals. Florida real estate law is not static,
and there seems to be no consistent pattern to its development. The Florida
courts and the legislature are actively involved in its continuing evolution.
We hope that this survey proves interesting and useful to professionals who
may ponder what will happen next.
